It’s safe to say that I’m a big fan of 3. Liga. There is something spectacular about that league that has so many important outcomes. Relegation to Regionalliga means a lot to clubs in a negative way, but promotion to the 2. Bundesliga is a great step up and makes the dream of playing in the 1. Bundesliga feasible.
In this article, I will look at Borussia Dortmund II. This second team is allowed to play in the 3. Liga, but is not allowed to be promoted. But there is enough incentive to get better and learn, as they are progressing the talents and making them ready for the first team.
Today I’m looking at the pressing from Borussia Dortmund II and I wanted to focus on the attack third pressing – pressing the goalkeeper and central defenders. I’ve taken the decision to this in the first 15 minutes of the game, as many 3. Liga teams are known for pressing their opponents early on and getting quick goals.
In the image above you can see the pressing done by Borussia Dortmund II in the 2021/2022 season so far. In this pitch provided by InStat you can see how they are set up: by third. If we look at the numbers of pressing, the defensive third has the least, followed by the middle third and the attacking third the most – which is quite local. In the time fram we are looking (0-15 minutes) Dortmund has pressed 35 times.
As you can see the pressing has been done in the middle but also on the flanks. For the purpose of this article I want to look at the pressing done at the goalkeeper and central defenders. You can see that in the image below.
As opposed to the pitch above, you see a pitch with 18 different zones. Now every zone can illustrate something really interesting, but again I want to focus on the attacking third, especially the middle zone with 14 in it. This 14 means that there were 14 pressing moments in the first 15 minutes of the games so far in this season.
Before I’m going to how Dortmund pressed, I wanted to explain why it’s relevant to look at this element of their game. If we want to see whether a team is aggressive and wants to recover the ball high up the pitch to create goalscoring opportunities from those areas, we can measure it by looking at the press. How do they do it? Where do they do it? I have 3 different examples where Dortmund do exactly that.
In the video above you Dortmund II in their game against Viktoria Berlin. The opposition has the ball and we see that Dortmund II is lined up with two inverted wingers/double #10 higher than the actual striker. At the moment that the goalkeeper passes the ball to one of his central defenders, the pressing has been triggered and the striker will press the player on the ball. Depending on which side the central defenders has his vision, that particular winger will press that flank as well. The striker presses aggressively while the wingers will only press intensely when the ball is going their way. The idea behind pressing in this example is to force the defender to give a long ball forward – in order to win the aerial duel and construct an attack themselves.
In the video above you Dortmund II in their game against VfL Osnabrück. You see 3 player in that 2-1 formation going forward. As soon as the ball is played from the central defender to the right full back, two players press as a unit towards the central defender and full back, with the #10 also following to block passing lanes or preventing the defensive midfielder getting the ball. In doing so they force the defence to play it long towards the middle third, or towards the goalkeeper – who will be pressed by one of the player from that two-man unit, making it uncomfortable for the goalkeeper.
In the video above we see Dortmund II in their game against Kaiserslautern. The attack ended at the right flank after which Kaiserslautern had the ball. They choose to resume play via the other flank to build, because there is space. When the defenders have the ball on the right flank, the pressing scheme is different, because the position of pressing is optimal. Instead of pressing organised or with 2 players, Dortmund II opt to only use the striker who needs to be aggressive in his pressing. This will mean that if it’s successful, the full back will play the ball back to the central defenders/goalkeeper or kick it long to the middle third.
Final third
In the first 15 minutes, everyone is fresh and steady. They want to make a mark and we have seen in the videos above how Dortmund II press the central defenders and the goalkeeper, by using different forms of intensity: a high pace, aggressive press by the striker and a structured press by the inverted wingers/double #10s in a unit. The press will be different later on in the game and subject to tactical changes, but Dortmund II set out to make a mark via this kind of pressing in the first 15 minutes.
Huh? Me writing about a club that’s in a top 5 European league? Yes, that’s right. In this article I will dive into Arsenal’s attacking corners from the 2018/2019, 2019/2020, 2020/2021 and the current 2021/2022 season. The objective of this article is to look at how the attacking corners have evolved in routines, and what the effective routines have been during those seasons.
I will be using video and data provided by Wyscout/Instat, which have been retrieved and updated until November 19th. Any attacking corners scored after this data will not be incorporated by me and I will focus on everything that happened before that data.
Season 2018/2019
In the image above you see all the successful corners by Arsenal in the 2018/2019 season. There have been scored 11 goals from 368 attacking corners, which is a success rate of 2,99% during this particular season. 6 goals came from the left, while 5 goals came from the right. 9 goals were scored as a result of direct contact, while 2 goals were the result of a second contact with one 1 goal being the result without a cross happening.
3 goals were scored in the goalkeeper zone, 1 goal was scored in the near post zone, 5 goals were scored from the 11-meter zone and 2 goals were scored from outside the zones mentioned above.
In the videos below you can see different corners of the same routine which has been successful in this particular season.
Arsenal’s set up:
Game vs Chelsea (H)
Inswinger
vs 4 player zonal structure
One player for short option
Second player deeper for outswinging cross
Two players guarding cleared balls and first line of rest-defence
One player in six-yard box
Four runners into six-yard box
As soon as the ball is kicked, it goes short and into the second player who is situated deeper in the opposition’s half. At the same time, we see the player in the six-yard box (Lacazette) dropping outside the box and together with the four runners, form a unit of five. Bellerin whips the ball towards the 11-meter zone, where Lacazette controls it and finishes quite brilliantly.
The key to some of these routines is that the 3rd player who isn’t involved, does drag defensive players to him – and therefore space opens up elsewhere.
Game vs Manchester United
Inswinger
vs 2 player zonal structure
One player outside six-yard box
3v3 in the 11 meter zone
One player short option
Two players cleared balls and first line of rest defence
The ball is kicked and swings towards the goalkeeper zone which means that the player for the short option, isn’t used. In the middle we see a 3v3 situation with the nearest player moving towards the near post, dragging his defender with him – creating a 2v2 situation in the middle. Mustafi does well to lose his marker and gets time and space to convert the cross into a goal (although with a stroke of luck).
Season 2019/2020
In the image above you see all the successful corners by Arsenal in the 2019/2020 season. There have been scored 10 goals from 364 attacking corners, which is a success rate of 2,75% during this particular season. 2 goals came from the left, while 8 goals came from the right. 2 goals were scored as a result of direct contact, while 2 goals were the result of a second contact cross.
2 goals were scored in the goalkeeper zone, 4 goals were scored in the near post zone, 4 goals were scored from the 11-meter zone and 0 goals were scored from outside the zones mentioned above.
In the videos below you can see different corners of the same routine which has been successful in this particular season.
Game vs Chelsea (H)
vs 3 player zonal structure
Outswinger
One player in six-yard box
One player just outisde six-yard box
3v3 in deep central zone
Three players outside penalty area for cleared balls and first line of rest-defence
Arsenal has been making use of the second ball in corners and in this particular season, they really did that well. The corner is an outswinger that turns away from the keeper and comes towards the central zones, where the 3v3 is instrumental. Chamber is in that group of 3 runners and moves forward and connects with the ball and sends it to the goalkeeper zone. In that zone is Aubameyang who was the player just outside the six-yard box and who anticipates this header from Chambers, loses his marker, and scores a good headed goal.
vs Bourenmouth
Inswinger
vs two player zonal structure
One player in six-yard box
One player just outside six-yard box
Three late runners into six-yard box
In this corner routine, Arsenal knows to connect directly with the cross and do so as follows. The two players in and around the six-yard box, both move to the near post and open space at the goalkeeper zone for the incoming runners. The unit of three splits, one player goes towards the far post, one player remains his deep position and one player makes a run towards the near post (Luiz) and the latter connects with the ball. Luiz’s header is guided to the far post and converts the cross into a goal for Arsenal.
Season 2020/2021
In the image above you see all the successful corners by Arsenal in the 2020/2021 season. There have been scored 5 goals from 362 attacking corners, which is a success rate of 1,38% during this particular season. 2 goals came from the left, while 3 goals came from the right. 3 goals were scored as a result of direct contact, while 1 goal was the result of a second contact and 1 goal from a second chance cross.
2 goals were scored in the goalkeeper zone, 0 goals were scored in the near post zone, 2 goals were scored from the 11-meter zone and 1 goal was scored from the far post zone.
In this particular season, Arsenal had a different approach to corners and scored significantly less goals from corners. What I will illustrate is that they se deep and late runners, but also make use of packing the six-yard box. In the videos below you can see different corners of the same routine which has been successful in this particular season.
Game vs Wolverhampton Wanderers
vs 4 player zonal structure
One player short option
One player deeper for outswinging cross
One player against six-yard box
Four deep, late runners – 4v4 situation
The ball is kicked and goes to the player deeper who is waiting to give an outswinging cross, while the player for the shorter option goes back into the penalty area. The cross is aimed at the area between the goalkeeper zone and the penalty spot, which makes it ideal for the runners to connect with it. The movement of those four runners and the fact that they are playing against a zonal structure in the central areas, makes it easier for Arsenal to score a goal and Gabriel does exactly that.
vs Fulham
vs 2 player zonal structure
5 player in six-yard box: 1-2-2 formation
Man-marked those 5 players
2 players outside penalty area for cleared balls and first line of rest defence
Outswinger
In this situation we see an outswinging corner delivered to the area between the goalkeeper zone and the far post zone, into a packed six-yard box. There are 8 defenders in that six-yard box vs 6 attacking players, and in the end it’s the aerial superiority of Gabriel that makes sure Arsenal wins this corner and scores a goal. Arsenal set up this way that they overload the central zones, and not the posts – hence winning the ball in the goalkeeper zone and converting it.
Season 2021/2022*
In the image above you see all the successful corners by Arsenal in the 2021/2022 season. There’s some discussion whether there have been scored 3 (Instat) or 4 (Wyscout), but it all depends on what you think is the aftermath of a corner or not. For this article we will stick with 3.
There have been scored 3 goals from 93 attacking corners, which is a success rate of 3,23% during this ongoing season season. 2 goals came from the left, while 1 goal came from the right. 3 goals were scored as a result of direct contact, while 0 goals were the result of a second contact or from a second chance cross.
1 goal was scored in the goalkeeper zone, 2 goals were scored in the near post zone, 0 goals were scored from the 11-meter zone and 0 goal was scored from the far post zone.
In this season, Arsenal have equiped themselves with a dedicated set piece coach, and that can be seen in the way they set themselves up in attacking corner, as I will try to illustrate in the videos below.
vs Leicester City (A)
Inswinger
vs 5 player zonal structure + man-markers
4 players in the six-yard box
2 runners (2v2)
2 players outside penalty area for cleared balls and first line of defence.
The ball is kicked and the ball swings into the near post zone, which is zonally marked. To not create too much crowd, the four players in the six-yard box remain their position. This means that the near post is zonally marked and the best way to exploit that is to have runners into that specific area. This is exactly what Arsenal does with White and Gabriel, with the latter connecting good with the ball and guiding it to the far corner, scoring a goal for Arsenal.
vs Aston Villa (H)
Inswinger
vs 3 player zonal structure
4 players in the six-yard box
2v2 – late runners
1 player tasked with cleared balls and first line of rest defence
As soon as the ball is kicked there’s movement in the penalty area. First of all the four players in the six-yard box split into 2 units of 2 players, with Lacazette-Aubameyang going to the far post and Partey-White going to the front post. The two runners (Gabriel-Tomiyasu) move into the central zones/goalkeeper zone. In the end it’s the ball that goes to the near post, where Partey connects with it and scores the goal for Arsenal.
Evolution
*2021/2022 is ongoing
When we look at the bar graph above, we see how many corners have been taken of the last few seasons. The number of corners taken has declined a bit, but overall they remain consistent. What we can say about this is that the given chances of making something of a corner, haven’t dropped and therefore we could give meaning to any changes made in routines.
*2021/2022 is ongoing
In the bar graph above you see two metrics combined: goals scored and success %. It tells us how many goals have been scored per season and what the success rate is if we look at the number of attacking corners taken. What’s interesting to see is that in 2020/2021 season, there were only 5 goals scored and the success rate was 1,38%. We can classify as a bad season, because the number of attacking corners taken remained almost the same.
Having made use of a set piece coach so far, we can see improvement in the numbers. 3 goals were scored (or 4 when you look at Wyscout) in 93 corners so far, which is a success rate of 3,23%. Now the season is long from over and the data will change, but in absolute data – this season is on its way to be a better season from the bad 2020/2021 season for Arsenal.
Final thoughts
It’s premature to jump to conclusions about the ongoing season, as it’s far from over – but giving the trend of the last seasons, it was needed to make a change. The 2020/2021 season was something the club wouldn’t want to emulate, and improvement was needed. Perhaps Arsenal is going back to the old performances in terms of goals, liked they did in 2018/2019 and 2019/2020, but how they do it – has definitely changed.
Arsenal makes use of 3 or more players in the six-yard box and occupy the opposition there, while making use of less runners. These runners do have a bigger chance of success, as the attention goes to the players in the six-yard box and zonal marking will be exploited and utilised by the two runners. If Arsenal keeps going on this trajectory, they could double figures in goals scored from corners – which eventually could lead to deciding games through set pieces.
This is the third piece in my series of case studies in the Dutch youth leagues. In this analysis I will look at man marking and zonal marking in set pieces with the focus on the U16 and U18 leagues in the Netherlands.
This analysis, however, deals with a smaller sample than the previously two written pieces. I have looked at the four professional clubs in the province of Limburg: VVV-Venlo, Fortuna Sittard, Roda JC and MVV Maastricht. The reason for that is that I’m quite familiar with their way of playing and that I have had the opportunity to visit training sessions of the U16’s and U18’s – therefore this analysis will focus on what I’ve observed with them.
In this analysis I will look at 4 routines executed by teams in those two age groups: there are two routines with man marking and two routines with zonal marking. It’s important to stress that this is not a consult of how man marking should be done or how zonal marking should be done – but it’s an observation of those routines in set pieces with the addition of commentary of what went right or wrong.
Man marking
So, what is man marking? You constantly mark a certain opponent – in the 90 minutes that you are on the pitch you are tasked with following one opponent all the time and making sure he can’t do something productive with the ball or make sure he can’t go into space without you following him/her.
The task is not so different when it comes to set pieces – a player is tasked with defending/following another player and when it comes to it, win the aerial duel in order to prevent a goalscoring opportunity.
Zonal marking
Zonal marking is the type of marking where a player covers/marks a space rather than a specific player. When the opponent enters a certain area, the player tasked with defending that space will take that player in marking.
This also applies when defending set pieces – the player has a space to defend close to the goal and will not deviate from that space to track a player.
Case study: 4 types of marking a set piece.
The first thing that I looked at was the idea of purely having man-marking or purely having zonal marking in the set piece defending. Only one situation had purely man marking and the rest had a combination of man marking and zonal marking. Before we look into this situations, I will show you in the image below which zones were used by the 4 clubs in order of defending:
Once again, this is not the ideal picture of the zones or the best way to look at it, but in the games I’ve observed there were 4 zones: the blue zone was defended by the keeper and central defenders, the orange zones by the full backs and in the white zone, the midfielders and attackers tried to win the aerial duels.
In this set pieces I’ve only looked at the positioning of the defending side, as that was were my emphasis was with this analysis.
Set piece 1:
In set piece 1 the situation was as follows:
Attacking side had 7 players in the box
Defending side had 9 players in the box
Pure man marking
In the image above the corner was takes from the right side and the beginning position of the 9 defending player was build up as follows: the whole defence was playing close to the keeper as the there were usually 3 attacking players trying to get into close position to the keeper.
While there were 4 defending player vs 3 attacking players, they were still man marking as the striker often was someone who had to be dealt with by 2 players. This was particularly seen in the U16 matches were you could see a significant difference in height between players: not everyone had fully grown yet.
The #8, #6, #10 and #7 were tasked with man marking any midfielder or defender in the box attacking the corner, but the #11 wasn’t. Although he was standing in the box, he was tasked with using his pace in the break and and to assists the #9 in the process of a counter-attack.
Set piece 2: 6 players zonal marking, 3 man marking
In set piece 2 the situation was as follows:
Attacking side had 6 players in the box
Defending side had 9 players in the box
3 man marking
4 zonal marking
2 on the posts
In this routine there was a combination of man marking and zonal marking. The four defenders were zonal marking as they marked the space instead of the man. #2 and #5 marked the zones just next to the goal and the #3 and #4 were marking the zones directly in front of the keeper.
The keeper wanted the two posts guarded as there were players at the opposition’s side that easily won aerial duels and post a threat in front of goal. In the image above this were #6 and #7 guarding the posts.
In the white zone of the box there were 3 players: #8, #10 and #11. They were man marking the incoming players from the opponent, but they also had a different task: blocking. They blocked the incoming runs – or tried to – from the opponent in order to prevent them having a powerful header towards goal.
Set piece 3: 5 zonal marking, 3 man marking
In set piece 3 the situation was as follows:
Attacking side 7 players
Defending side 8 players
4 man marking
3 zonal marking
1 on the post
This set piece set up was also a combination of zonal marking and man marking with one player on the post. the four defenders were tasked the blue zone (central defenders #3 and #4) and the orange zone (full backs #5 and #2). #5 has two tasks – he not only has to guard his zone, but also stay alert of any space near the first post when taken from this side, as this post has been left free by the keeper.
There were 3 players white zone and they were man marking and blocking runs from the incoming attacking players. They were not only tasked with that, but they needed to be decisive and secure in their way of heading the ball out of danger – the #9 and #11 were situated to anticipate their balls and lead the counter-attack with the 3 man markers moving up the pitch in that particular situation.
Set piece 4: 4 zonal marking, 4 man marking
In set piece 4 the situation was as follows:
Attacking side 6 players
Defending side 6 players
No players on posts
4 players zonal marking
4 players man marking
In the last set piece situation there were no players on either posts, leaving the orange and blue zones to be defended by the 4 defenders. Again this was a combination of zonal marking and man marking, with the defenders playing zonal marking in this situation. The posts were also covered by the full backs #2 and #5 – among the other tasks they had.
The attacking side played with two strong strikers and they formed a line of 2, which led the defending side to play man marking in the white zone with #10 and #6 tasked with marking the 2 strong strikers. As seen in the cases above, these 4 players were tasked with blocking incoming runs and clear the ball when the aerial duels were won.
The #9 and #11 were standing outside the box anticipating a counter attack. In this case the #9 stood closer to his own box and the #11 stood less wide as it in the previous situation.
Interesting points
Obviously a lot of things went wrong – football is not a sport of perfections, but of errors and how you react to them. Defending set pieces and in this particular case corners, is something that is often defended with the head. If you look at the age groups I’ve looked at, not everyone is matured enough in his physical appearance or has developed the skill of heading enough. So a lot of corners result into situations that lead to goal or to individual errors which you would not see in the senior sides.
Another interesting thing to notice is the intellectual abilities of the players. We certainly don’t have to underestimate players that feature in an academy – they know what the tactical concepts are behind man marking and zonal marking, but the execution in real match situations – that’s different stuff. Anticipating and reacting to unforeseen actions on the pitch, that’s where these age groups are developing and need developing in order to achieve a higher level in defending set pieces like a corner.
VVV-Venlo lost Roel Janssen to Fortuna Sittard and needed a new left-back in their squad. This has been the hardest position to recruit in the last seasons with Roel Janssen, Leroy Labylle, Axel Borgmann and Jason Bourdouxhe. Roel Janssen was signed from Fortuna Sittard, but he played as a full back in Sittard and he never was the vibrant left back VVV-Venlo needed in attack.
Crotone was doing really well in the Serie B before Corona madness struck Italy. Right now there is no clarity about the league to be continued. Part of Crotone’s promotion-chasing side is the goalkeeper Alex Cordaz. The 37-year-old veteran has been instrumental in their promotion push. He has quite the track record with playing for a lot of sides over the years: Inter, Spezia, Acireale, AS Pizzighettone, Treviso, FC Lugano, Cittadella, Parma, ND Gorica and finally Crotone.
Het seizoen is klaar. Een goed moment voor mij om mijn eigen voetbalblog te beginnen lijkt mij. Op deze blog kun je zowel Engelse als Nederlandse geschreven artikelen vinden over voetbaltactiek en scouting. In deze eerste post kijk ik naar de hoge lijn van Robert Maaskant met daarbij een stukje pressing van de aanvallende linie en de consequenties daarvan.
Robert Maaskant wou met VVV-Venlo een stuk aanvallender gaan spelen en liet dit ook merken in zijn speelwijze. Hij speelde vaak met een 4-2-3-1. Dit lijkt niet heel aanvallend, want Maurice Steijn speelde ook met deze formatie, maar Maaskant opteerde voor een aanvallende versie hiervan. Maurice Steijn speelde zeer compact met een diepliggende middenvelders op eigen helft en de viermans verdediging die kort op de keeper speelde. Maaskant verkoos liever hoge backs, waarbij Pachonik erg hoog stond en Janssen voor zijn doen ook. In de restverdediging had je dan de centrale verdedigers + een verdedigende middenvelder die dan terugzakte.
Maaskant koos voor iets anders dan Steijn. Hij schoof het verdedigende blok van twee of dubbele ‘6’ op naar het midden van het veld en poogde een hoge defensieve lijn. Dit kun je hieronder zien.
Maaskant wilde in de aanvallende fase en in de transitie van verdediging naar aanval, dat de nummer 8 doorschoof en daardoor een aanvallende 4-1-4-1 scheppen. Als je veel wil aanvallen, dan moet je risico’s nemen en die moet je incalculeren. Je kunt namelijk de bal verliezen en dan moet je in de transitie van aanval naar verdediging goed staan in je restverdediging. Dat wil zeggen, wat is er nog precies over van je verdediging.
Als je zo wil spelen, met een hoge defensieve lijn, met de backs hoog op eigen helft of zelfs op de hoogte van de middenvelders, dan zul je voorin iets moeten doen. Anders is je centrale verdediging erg kwetsbaar.
Wat je dan als team zou moeten doen is pressing, of in gewoon Nederlands: druk zetten. Door druk te zetten wil je eigenlijk een doel bereiken: de bal veroveren. Met een hoge defensieve lijn moet je altijd druk zetten, ongeacht het niveau of kwaliteit. Als VVV de gele pionnen zijn, dan moet de nummer 9 druk zetten op de twee centrale verdedigers. De nummer 10, moet de verdedigende middenvelder pressen en de flankspelers 11 en 7, pakken de backs. Zo wordt voorkomen dat ze makkelijk vooruit kunnen en van de verdediging naar de aanval kunnen.
Zoals je dus ziet hierboven, zou VVV-Venlo dus druk moeten zetten op de verdediging van de tegenstander, die probeert op te bouwen vanuit achteruit. Dit is het moment dat je druk moet zetten op de verdediging. Door druk te zetten dwing je de tegenstanders tot keuzes en daar komt risico bij kijken. Het liefste wil je dan een lange bal zien, want dan kun je een kopduel winnen en zelf opbouwen of in transitie omschakelen naar de aanval.
Dit is theoretisch, maar dit was niet het geval bij het VVV-Venlo van Maaskant. Hij speelde met Wright of Soriano in de spits, met Sinclair, Van Ooijen en/of Yeboah op de flanken. De spelers die wel druk zetten kwamen vanuit het middenveld, maar Neudecker en Linthorst deden dat te weinig, waardoor je pas in de tweede fase druk ging zetten.
In theorie dus een mooi verhaal. Hoog druk zetten, maar dan moet je het wel consequent uitvoeren. Anders krijg je verschillende problemen. VVV-Venlo had onder Maaskant een tweeledig probleem met druk zetten:
De positionering en actie was niet goed. Om goed druk te kunnen zetten, moet je ook in de juiste positie staan om druk uit te oefenen. Is dat niet het geval, dan kom je te laat en laat je gaten op het middenveld over, waardoor je tegenstander in overtal komt.
Wanneer je geen druk zet met je aanvallers, dan hebben de verdedigers ruimte op te stomen, waardoor er een dreigendere situatie ontstaat.
In afbeelding hierboven kun je zien dat de centrale verdedigers in deze opstelling ieder twee mogelijkheden hebben op de bal naar te passen. Zodra de bal bij de 7 en de 8 komt, dan heb je als VVV zijnde al een ondertal in de as. Nu zou VVV-Venlo zich moeten versterken met de backs die dan snel terug moeten komen, maar omdat die zo hoog staan – levert dat al gevaarlijke situaties op.
Zoals je in de afbeelding hierboven ziet, is er enorm veel ruimte op de flanken voor de tegenstanders. Het ligt er natuurlijk aan wat voor speelwijze de tegenstander hanteert, maar wat we vaak konden zien is dat vleugelaanvallers heel goed gebruik maakten van die ruimte. De nummer 10 in dit voorbeeld kreeg de bal en speelde die naar de spits. Vervolgens duikt de vleugelspeler de ruimte in en krijgt de bal terug van de spits. Dan is het vrij gemakkelijk om een voorzet te geven, waaruit gevaar kan ontstaan.
Als conclusie kun je enkele zaken stellen. VVV-Venlo had met Maaskant een trainer die aanvallender wou denken dan zijn voorganger Steijn. Hij poogde dit te doen, door een aanvallende 4-2-3-1 of 4-1-4-1 te gebruiken in de competitie met een hoge verdedigende lijn. Dit werkte niet om verschillende redenen, maar doordat de er niet goed druk gezet werd door de aanvallende linie, werd het middenveld overlopen en vielen er gaten achter de verdediging, met name bij de flanken omdat de backs zo hoog stonden opgesteld. Het pressen verliep niet goed, omdat het niet gedaan werd of omdat het te laat gedaan werd en de spelers die speelden, niet wisten wanneer ze de situatie moesten herkennen om over te gaan op het druk zetten.
