Maand: april 2022

ORKUN KÖKÇÜ — SCOUT REPORT 2021/2022

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Feyenoord. One of the big clubs in the Netherlands with the potential to be the biggest club, but that’s where it is usually left: potential. This goes for results, but it is also used for the players that are full of talent. They are doing well, especially in the Eredivisie, but too few have made the step from being a talent into a great player in one of Europe’s top leagues. But, it seems that there is one player that could change that all: Orkun Kökçü.

Biography

  • Name: Orkun Kökçü
  • Date of birth: 19–12–2000
  • Nationality: Turkish
  • Position: Central midfielder, attacking midfielder
  • Contract expires: 30–6–2025
  • Current club: Feyenoord Rotterdam
  • Previous clubs: FC Groningen (Y), Feyenoord (Y)
  • Current international: Turkey

Theoretical Frame
With the theoretical frame, I try to look at what the scout report is meant to be saying about the player. In this case, I’m looking at the abilities of Kökçü in comparison to the league he most likely will go to. There have been rumors and interest from clubs in the English Premier League, so every claim and opinion in this piece will be in relation to his ability to play in that league.

The reason for this is that while Kökçü might be a top 5% player in the Netherlands or similar leagues, this might be completely different from other leagues. Not every good player in the Eredivisie will be a good player (instantly) in the Premier League and it’s important to keep that in mind when doing these reports.

Data and video collection
The data used in this scout report comes from different sources. The match data which will be used in graphs and plots come from Wyscout and contains Eredivisie results only from the 2021/2022 season. The reason why this is is to compare the players in this league to Kökçü and not every player will have played the same amount of international games for club or country — hence only the Eredivisie. He is compared to midfielders in the league.

The event data used in pass maps, shot maps, and heat maps come from Opta.

The video clips come from Wyscout and have been clipped from full games or downloaded as clips from the platform. Again, all these are from Eredivisie games in the 2021/2022 season.

All the data and video have been accurate and up to date, collected on April 26th, 2022.

Position and roles
Orkun Kökçü is a midfielder, but in that capacity has played in diferent positions this season. While he can be classified as a central midfielder, he has played the majority of his minutes in the Eredivisie this season, as a defensive midfielder.

Now, he is not a typical defensive midfielder, but here we have the debate between positions and roles. As position, he played as a defensive midfielder in a double pivot as employed by Arne Slot. Feyenoord usually plays in a 4–2–3–1 formation with Kökçü in that double pivot role.

If we look into his role rather than his position, we see the importance of him dictating play with his passes and progressing the ball from deep — allowing the attacking midfield trio to move up on the pitch. Therefore we can characterise him more as an 8 than a 6 on the pitch at Feyenoord.

Off the ball movement and positioning

In the image above you can see where Kökçü does his events during the games in the Eredivisie this season. While he plays in the double pivot, he is often seen in the left half space on the opposition’s half. Trying to penetrate the final third with his key passing, which we will see in the next section of this analysis.

In this role of his, he is responsible for progressing the ball further into the middle third and allowing others to become more advanced in either the wide areas or central areas. He is a player who opens up opportunities for the attacking players.

Key passing

In the image above you can see how well Kökçü is doing in the key passes per 90 and through passes per 90 metrics. He is doing well in both these metrics, as he scores above average with 0,58 key passes per 90 and 1,52 through passes per 90.

Key passing is of vital importance for a player like Kökçü as he is seen as the one that dictates play with his passing. He drops down from the midfield and poses as an instrument to connect the defence to the attack. His progression via key passing is instrumental as we will see in the next section, but his contribution to the attacking play is something he is considered for too.

In the graph below you can see how well he performs in the key passing metrics, compared to his peers on that position.

To illustrate his ability, I’ve taken three specific clips to showcase how he contributes to the attacking contribution via through passes.

In the video above you see a clip from Feyenoord vs FC Utrecht with Kökçü on the left. He receives the ball and spots a runner in the middle, making a movent to the left. His vision is the most important in this case, as he sees a run that most didn’t anticipate.

In the video above you see Feyenoord in their away match against Heracles Almelo, as Kökçü situates himself on the right side. He is in the box and makes himself available for the combination with the winger and as he gets it, he immediately passes it into the space which is vacant. By doing that the winger can invert and get ready for the cross.

In the video above you can see Feyenoord in their game against Willem II. Kökçü has proven to see where the space is for his teammates and in this example, that’s no different. The ability to find himself pressed but still pick out a through pass to an unmarked teammate, is something that makes him stand out.

Progression

We have seen above how well he does with progressing on the pitch via his passing, but how well does he with the ball on his feet? You can see that in the scatterplot below.

In the scatterplot above you see the metrics or progressive runs per 90 and dribbles per 90 combined. These metrics illustrate how well a player is doing on the progression of the ball on his feet, in contrast to the progression via passing.

Kökçü does above average in this metric as you can see, but isn’t exceptional. He has 2,27 progressive runs per 90 and 3,39 dribbles per 90. In the two clips below, I will show you how his dribbling looks like on the pitch.

In the video above you see Feyenoord in their game against FC Utrecht where Kökçü gets the ball on the left. It’s a combination that occurs often. He cuts inside and then moves outwards. At the moment he does that, a defender will step out and create space on the far end of the pitch – after which Kökçü will spot the runner.

In the video above you can see Feyenoord in their match against Willem II. Kökçü gets the ball in zone 14 and dribbles past his direct opponent, setting himself up for a shot. His attempt isn’t successful but it shows what he can do to get himself in a good position.

Expected threat

In the image above I have illustrated how well Kökçü does in the expected threat (xT) metric in this season’s Eredivisie. Before I look further into this, this is what xT is:

The basic idea behind xT is to divide the pitch into a grid, with each cell assigned a probability of an action initiated there to result in a goal in the next N actions. This approach allows us to value not only parts of the pitch from which scoring directly is more likely, but also those from which an assist is most likely to happen. Actions that move the ball, such as passes and dribbles (also referred to as ball carries), can then be valued based solely on their start and end points, by taking the difference in xT between the start and end cell. In the case of Grealish, his ball carry brought a 0.013 xT increase, and the pass added a further 0.26 xT. In short, he moved the ball from a low-xT cell (0.02 xT) to a much more dangerous area of the pitch (0.32 xT). Note that the xT action value can be negative for passes and carries that move the ball away from goal. â€“ Soccerments

In short, how much does Kökçü contribute to the expected threat of a sequence of actions towards goal? If we look at the top 10 players of this season we see that Kökçü scores 3rd.

Shooting

In this part of the analysis, we will look at the quality of the shooting by Kökçü. In the scatterplot below you can see his expected goals per 90.

In the volume of shots, we can see that Kökçü does above average. He has 2,44 shots per 90. In the expected goals generated from those shots, the Feyenoord midfielder performs above average as well with 0,18 xG per 90. But it has to be said that he isn’t the most prolific striker of the ball in terms of generating xG.

Obviously, this tells us how he converts his shots into xG, but where does he take his shots? This will give us a more clear idea of why his xG is generated the way it is.

In the shot map above you can see where Kökçü takes his shots. He has 72 shots in the season so far, generating a total xG of 5,35. The actual goals he has scored have been 7, including 2 penalties. This means that he is overperforming his xG slightly by +1,65. This means that the likelihood of scoring is lower than his actual goal tally in the 2021/2022 Eredivisie season.

In the video below you can see all his goals in the Eredivisie so far:

Assists

In the scatterplot above you see the metrics expected assists and assists per 90 combined. This shows us how many assists Kökçü is expected to give per 90 minutes and the actual assists he gives per 90. In this aspect of his end product, he does very well. He has 0,26 xA per 90 minutes and gives 0,2 assists per 90. This means he is slightly underperforming with -0.06 per 90.

In total, he is expected to give 7,65 assists in this Eredivisie season and because he assisted 6, he is underperforming with -1,65. A notion of his assisting numbers is that he is the one for the set pieces, and therefore generates a higher xA than from open play.

Here are all his assists from the season so far:

Final thoughts

Orkun Kökçü is a talented player who is ready for the next step. He can definitely play in either the Bundesliga, La Liga, Serie A, Premier League or Ligue 1 – but he is suitable for some roles better than others. While he is used as an 8 in the double pivot, his data suggests that he is very good in the creating from the half space and zone 14, with his assists numbers being very good as well as his contribution to the expected threat.

As a central midfielder with an attacking mind, he could definitely contribute a lot as he likes to dictate play in the beginning of the attack, but also his danger in the attacking third. His attacking vision and awareness of runners is good, but his defensive contribution can be described as slow. For a box-to-box midfielder, he has a great work ethic and vision – also on the defensive side. But his pace between transitions is something he could work on, as well as choosing the moments where he takes a shot.

ERIK TEN HAG AT FC UTRECHT: AN ELITE COACH IN THE MAKING

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With Erik ten Hag set to be appointed the next Manchester United manager, I thought it would be a good idea to look at Ten Hag’s experience in the Eredivisie. Now, everyone has looked at his Ajax tenure – rightly so. But, I wanted to focus on his period at FC Utrecht which shaped him into an elite manager.

In this article, I will look at three different aspects of what he achieved and changed while at FC Utrecht:

  1. Professionalism
  2. Transfers
  3. Tactics
  4. Final thoughts

Before I get into that I wanted to say that the data in this article are from Wyscout. Furthermore, it’s important to stress that FC Utrecht isn’t a small club in the Netherlands. They have won the Dutch Cup three times as well as the Supercup once. Their ambition is to consistently qualify for the European play-offs in the Eredivisie as well as pose a threat to the big 4 (Ajax, AZ, Feyenoord, PSV).

Ten Hag has moved into the top, step by step. His managerial career started at Go Ahead Eagles where he achieved promotion to the Eredivisie. After that, he went to Bavaria and coached Bayern München II, before he returned to the Netherlands and coached FC Utrecht. His experience in Germany and his ambition made sure FC Utrecht started to develop on and off the pitch.

PROFESSIONALISM

It’s a bit extreme to call FC Utrecht a sleeping giant, but there is a massive potential to get good results in the league. This doesn’t only depend on what happens on the pitch, but you need to create the right context and environment for professional athletes to thrive. So how did Ten Hag do that at FC Utrecht?

First of all, he changed the training quantity. The first team was required to train more than once per day and the intensity would be higher in the training sessions. With that notion, the club also would track what the players were eating as Ten Hag firmly believes that every aspect of professional life should be of high quality. This also translates into the analysis department of the club. It was instrumental for his way of preparing that he could see event data translated into analysis, so he could track the players’ movements, decision making and on-ball activity.

In addition to this, there also was the matter of the training grounds – especially the pitches. They were taken care of by the municipality, but this changed as Ten Hag wanted professional groundsmen and the control that the club took care of the grounds. All this feeds into the change of mentality Ten Hag wanted to achieve at FC Utrecht. With Ten Hag you need to have the mentality to win every game and even if you win games, you always have to be critical of your own performance.

TRANSFERS

Transfers 15/16

In the summer of 2015, Ten Hag became head coach of FC Utrecht and in his first season, we saw two distinct things. First, he cut a lot of dead weight. Players who were earning too much or just simply weren’t good enough. As you can see on the outgoing transfers, 15 players exited the club during the whole season, with 12 players leaving in the summer.

He did attract a few players who became instrumental like Strieder, Letschert and Haller. Now Haller was already on loan with Utrecht, so he can’t really take the credit for that. In regards to what English media have said about not giving youth a chance, that’s utter codswallop. Ramselaar, Amrabat and Joosten all were included in the squad.

Finished 11th in the 2014/2015 season, Ten Hag did really well in his first season – finishing 5th and qualifying for the domestic play-offs for European football.

Transfers 16/17

In his second season, we see another shift in losing dead weight, majority of the players simply is’t good enough or their contracts have run out. However, a difference from a season earlier is that Ten Hag also has sold some of their most important players – as they have done exceptionally well. In selling Ramselaar, Letschert and Boymans – they have generated over €9 million for those three players.

If we compare that to incoming players they have only spent €500,000 on new players (Van der Meer, Jensen), the rest came on a free, from the academy or was loaned from another club.

Another relatively successful transfer period and it resulted in a good position in the league as well. As they finished 5th in the 2015/2016 season, they now finished even higher on the 4th place in the table.

TACTICS

Before we move into the actual analysis of the tactics and style of play, I will place the analysis into context. I’m going to have a look at the 2016/2017 season for a number of reasons. It’s the highest finish in the league under Ten Hag, his style of play was seen throughout the squad and it was the season that attracted Ajax to his coaching style.

There are different components to analyse:

  1. Formation
  2. Defensive play
  3. Attacking play
  4. Counter-attacks
  5. Data
  6. The progress in the importance of full backs FC Utrecht -> Ajax

Formation

Ten Hag’s most used formations in this particular season were the 4-3-1-2/4-4-2 (51%), 4-3-3 (18%) and the 3-4-1-2 (10%). This depends on the opposition of course, but what’s good to understand is that he didn’t want the traditional Dutch school of attacking football. He wanted to maximise results and is very pragmatic in his approach in doing so, therefore being different to most coaches in 2015-2017 in the Netherlands.

This 4-3-1-2 can also be classified as a 4-4-2, depending on the position of Barazite. Often he played more like a #10 and closer to the strikers and it became a 4-3-1-2 with three central midfielders – with Brama a bit deeper. But when you play with a midfield square you Brama as the defensive midfielder and Barazite as the attacking midfielder, with Ayoub-Amrabat providing support in linking the defence to attack.

That 4-4-2 could also easily become a 4-3-3 with Barazite playing as a striker with Haller and Kerk on the flanks. The role of the two strikers is important for their dynamic play. While Haller is strong in the air and has good link-up play, Kerk is agile, versatile, and strong. These two players complement each other in attack and have enough ability to set up the midfielders as well.

Defensive play

So what does the defensive structure look like under Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht? I think it’s worth noting that he doesn’t do this in the traditional Dutch sense. He likes to keep it compact and we can see a few interesting things in how he sets it up. He only has the full backs in the wide areas and most of the player (6) are situated in the half spaces.

Full backs in wide areas, rest compact in central zones

In the image above you can see the defensive set up. One of the interesting parts is that the #10 will go into the striker position when FC Utrecht is in the pressing shape. In doing so it enables the #1o to help the two strikers who assume the winger positions without the ball and do the pressing as such. This means that the first pressing moment is done by a winger (Haller/Kerk) and Barazite will press the goalkeeper when he receives the ball. Ten Hag wants to press with three attackers. This means that one will press the central defender on the ball, the striker will press the goalkeeper and the third defender will remain close to the other central defender, to block the passing lane:

Pressing with strikers

In the image above you see how this has been done with the three attackers pressing. First, the winger presses the RCB who can only pass without risk to the keeper in his eyes because the passing lane is blocked to the RB. The defensive midfielder is an option, but he will be pressed too. As soon as the keeper has the ball, the striker will press the goalkeeper who can only play it long.

The two strikers do not only position themselves to be ready for the transition but they are actively involved in the defensive process. This means that attackers are expected to have defensive qualities as well under Ten Hag. They need to block passing lanes, track back and make sure to stand in between the central defenders and full backs. Ten Hag sees it as follows: you attack with the collective and you defend with the collective.

In general, Ten Hag didn’t press aggressively with Utrecht, but as soon as the opposition got into the position in the middle third, they would be marked closely and attempted to win the ball there as it gives advantages in transition (see counter-attack). Again, there is a vital role to play for the #10 in following a central defender who steps out. If a central defender moves up the pitch and attempts to progress via a carry or pass, the #10 Barazite will follow in order to limit the threat, while the two attackers will assume their original role.

Attacking play

For Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht there was one thing most important: attacking through dominance in the central zones. Bar the two full backs, everyone is in these central zones. The reason for that is that the LB and RB create more space for the central midfielders in the central zones, which is vital for the build-up.

Attacking options via central midfielders

So how does Ten Hag construct attacks using the left and right central midfielders? In this case the left central midfielder was Ayoub and the right central midfielder was Amrabat. There are two scenario’s in how they conduct the build-up and be as direct as possible.

The first one is where a central defender reaches Ayoub. In this case, left central defender Janssen, passes the ball to Ayoub who has assumed the position away from the half-space and come into the wide area. He stretches play, creating more space in the central zones in doing so. Then, he has two options. He can opt to play in the feet of Haller on the left side or he can play it in space where Kerk has to make a run. Haller needs to connect with other players to create a chance, while the option for Kerk will mean a shooting opportunity.

The second one is where a central defender opts for the right central midfielder option. This is less direct as the one mentioned above. The central defender plays to the defensive midfielder (Brama) who has dropped deeper. He will pass to Amrabat (RCM) and then he will connect with the attackers. Instead of playing it direct and straight, he will opt to play a ball behind the defence, utilising Kerk’s pace. At the same time, Haller moves to the far post in order to await a cross. The role of #10 is to cover the ground behind Kerk in terms of making sure transitions will be less dangerous.

In the image above you can see how the #10 Barazite acts with his through passes in case of ball possession in the final third. There are two different options. Important here is that Haller is not involved in the receiving of the through ball, as he isn’t equiped to make that run needed.

The first option is to pass in a straight line towards the penalty spot. Kerk will lose his marker and make a run inwards to get in the ideal position to shoot. The second option is to pass the ball to the right, where the RCM Ambarat will make a run between the defenders and enter the box from the right side. This could prove a good shooting opportunity, but also a good passing option as both Kerk and Haller will make a run to the far post.

Above you can see how the attackers react to cross from Amrabat from the right half space. Barazite willl move into the box on the right, while both Kerk and Haller will move to the far post zone, to attack the cross. Amrabat and Troupee stay on the right, to create space in the central zones – and there is where it has to happen for Ten Hag.

Counter-attack

In Ten Hag’s vision for FC Utrecht, he most likely wanted to regain possession in the middle third. In doing so, the positioning of the attacking midfielder(s) is absolutely vital going forward. In this case, it’s Barazite. He is instrumental in the counter-attack set out by Ten Hag.

In the image above you see the situation when there’s a counter-attack after regaining possession by the LB. Earlier we spoke about the 4-3-3 in defence, but as soon as the ball is further on the pitch – Barazite will drop deeper. After the ball is regained in the wide area by the LB, Barazite will move up the pitch and assume a position between the lines. In doing so he can adjust correctly and pass the ball to either striker. Because the strikers are playing in the half-space they can move to the wing or invert, which gives the defenders problems and FC Utrecht options on the break.

When the ball is regained in the middle third by the midfielders, everything is set to be played directly. This often occurs with Amrabat and he has two options, play it straight to Barazite or play it long behind the defence for Kerk. Again, Haller will make a run towards the far post to anticipate a cross.

Statistics

So how well did Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht score on the different statistics during the 2016/2017 season where they finished 4th? You can see that in the images below. (There is an issue with the quality of images showing on the website, click on image and open in another tab for higher quality)

In the graphs above you see how FC Utrecht scored in the shots per 90 metrics compared to the other teams in the Eredivisie 2016/2017. FC Utrecht scores 9th on the number of shots per 90. Below that you see the graph of expected goals per 90. FC Utrecht scores 4th in this metric, which does suggest they take most of their chances

But how do they do when shooting, what is the quality of those shots? In other words, what the expected goals number per shot taken?

You can see that FC Utrecht has the highest xG per shot in the Eredivisie. They are 9th on the shots per 90, but when they come in shooting positions – they do this in the most optimal positions/situations in relation to the other teams in the 2016/2017 Eredivisie. Ten Hag wants to use his attacking play to maximise the chance of scoring a goal. His idea was to limit the shots from outside the box and move into more certain positions of scoring – this resulted in the high xG per shot, as shown above.

On the goalscoring front, they were 5th with 1,54 goals per 90 – with only Feyenoord, Ajax, PSV and AZ scoring more per 90 minutes. It indicated they are doing very well in attack, making sure they are in the right positions and capitalising on those goalscoring opportunities.

How did Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht do in defence? We use the metrics of conceding shots, expected goals and goals to review this.

In the graph above you can see that has the 4th fewest shots against per 90 minutes. Only Ajax, Feyenoord and PSV concede fewer shots per 90. The strongest defences in the leagues conceded the fewest chances, but how many goals are they expected to concede? This measures the quality of the chances given away.

The quality of the chances conceded corresponds with the shots against per 90 minutes. FC Utrecht has the 4th fewest expected goals against per 90 minutes. This strongly indicates that their defence has been pretty solid. This also can be seen in the goals conceded per 90: 1,07. This was the 4th best in the data of the 2016/2017 season.

It’s interesting to see the data because they had a very good second season under Ten Hag. They were better than AZ and only the traditional top 3 (Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV) were better than this FC Utrecht side. A very impressive achievement.

Players’ reception of Ten Hag’s philosophy

When Ten Hag came into the FC Utrecht management, players were rather sceptical of his ideas. He changed a lot within the club, but most of all it was his way of coaching during training sessions. The obvious question was: what does this way of working do for us?

With the way of coaching, it can be seen as follows. Ten Hag uses a lot of moments during situations with a training session or drill to coach players. He often stops play and coaches what he wants to see and that will lead to friction sometimes. He has spoken about it in Dutch media and no player really likes it. But if the methods start to pay dividends in the games, players accept them because in the end, they want to win.

The reason why Ten Hag does this is that he wants the team to control multiple systems and that requires a lot of detail and attention from the coaching staff. But he has also admitted that too much of this way of coaching and the freedom of creativity can be lost – while that is very important for certain types of players.

The way he tries to avoid those problems is not to say what has to happen in the situations he stops play, but to ask questions. He does this to activate the brain of the players and that they are aware of the thought process behind it. Being transparent in why he demands these things of his players, is where players will accept it more.

For Ten Hag, it’s about giving context to every possible situation that can happen on the pitch and teaching the players about risk management. Because in the game, the players have to judge the risk of their actions themselves.

Players don’t need to enjoy everything they do on the training pitch, but they need to understand why they are doing it. That creates understanding and acceptance. For that to happen communication is vital and that’s what Ten Hag has done very well.

The evolution of Ten Hag’s full backs

Being FC Utrecht, there are always a few games per season that you will be the lesser team. The games against Ajax, AZ, PSV, and Feyenoord are very difficult matches and one can expect to drop points. Ten Hag has shown his pragmatism here and has employed a 5-3-2 on occasion to make sure defensive display is the priority.

When he made the step to Ajax this changed. You are expected to win everything and as a consequence, the view of the game will change as well. Ten Hag had to adapt to the stature and philosophy of Ajax and I think this is an interesting point as many critical pundits have shared their feelings about it. We have seen above that at FC Utrecht, Ten Hag wanted to create from the central zones and the positioning and actions of the full backs were in aid of that. They stood wide to create more space in the central zones, but this had to change at Ajax.

He was expected to play an attacking style of football that saw wingers in the wide areas as they play with three attackers. Keep the field wide to stretch the opponent and use the wingers to provide danger into the box. This also meant a change in the role of the full backs.

He had to adapt and there’s been a lot written already about it. I suggest you have a look at this thread by Jamie Scott. He analyses in great detail what Manchester United can expect from Erik ten Hag based on his Ajax tenure. Especially the (over) reliance on full backs is worth the read, as it’s something that’s different from his FC Utrecht period.

📌 Erik ten Hag to Manchester United [thread]:
– ten Hag’s Principles of Play at Ajax
– Strengths and Complexities of the System
– Suitability for the Premier League and United’s Squad pic.twitter.com/tfJO3paxDN— Jamie Scott (@JamiescottUV) March 22, 2022

FINAL THOUGHTS

Erik ten Hag came into international media due to his excellent European exploits with Ajax. But this wasn’t the beginning of his success. The promotion to the Eredivisie with Go Ahead Eagles, his successful spell with Bayern München II and of course his time at FC Utrecht, made him what he is today.

At FC Utrecht he has shown how to elevate a club from mid-table to sub top, whilst competing for European tickets as well. He has taken a squad, cut the dead weight and taken to the transfer market combined with academy players. His distinct style of play, his professional mentality throughout the whole club and consistency in performances – have formed him and prepared him for the Ajax job. The progression from FC Utrecht to Ajax is important to understand what he can do for Manchester United.

Sources:

Tussen de Linies
Voetbaltrainer
VI Pro

CRYSTAL PALACE AND THE ART OF THE LONG BALL

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I have always been fascinated by the use of a long ball. In terms of using a long ball, it’s often regarded as a negative thing to do – or at least it has been for a long time. Now we have started to look a bit differently at the game in terms of attack and defence, which leads us to the fact that a defensive style of play isn’t negative football. It’s all about which principles you adhere to.

In this particular case study, I wanted to look at Crystal Palace. The reason for that is because, in the Premier League, Crystal Palace has the second number of long balls per 90 minutes.

Credit: Wyscout

As you can see in the image above, Crystal Palace has many long passes per 90 minutes – but are surrounded by teams who are battling against relegation. Solely based on this, the question remains: do Crystal Palace play conservative football and are they under pressure a lot, to maintain the long ball?

Obviously, the question above is generalised and not based on any evidence, but the interesting point still holds ground. What do Crystal Palace do in their game, that they maintain the long ball so much? To answer that in part, I’m analysing the long balls by the four players with the most long balls in the Crystal Palace’s squad:

  • Tyrick Mitchell
  • Marc Guehi
  • Joachim Andersen

These players are all defenders which makes it an interesting case, but we shouldn’t be biased or prejudiced. Defenders are more than just people who defend, they are players who construct attacks and lead the defensive organsiation. In that light, I have made the distinction between long balls that:

a) Strengthen the defensive organisation
b) Construct attacks

The analysis will be done by looking at a few examples of every player. The footage comes from Wyscout and has been taken from the platform prior to April 9th, 2022. Any results after that haven’t been included in this analysis.

Strengthening the defensive organisation

One use of the long ball can be to reorganise the defensive shape of the team. When a team is under the pressure from the opposition, this can lead to hazardous situations. One can be that the central defenders and or full backs are being pressed aggressively and their only way out is to play a long ball and regain their defensive solid positioning.

Another way is when there has been a counter-attack from the opposition and in order to regroup and make sure the rest defence is aided, is to clear the ball long and give the other players time to drop deep again.

In the three examples below we look at the three players in the defence of Crystal Palace, making sure the team has room, space and time to reorganise their defensive shape.

In the video above we see Tyrick Mitchell in the FA Cup game against Everton. Everton has the ball in the defensive third of Crystal Palace and are looking threatening to the defence. The ball comes to Mitchell’s feet who just gives the ball long into the high middle third. In doing so the accent of play goes to that area, the attackers drop deep and therefore the defence can reorganise. They go the most optimal position and move up the pitch, to maintain a higher line – as Crystal Palace is looking to be more attacking in this phase.

In the video above, you see Crystal Palace in their Premier League game against Arsenal. Marc Guehi is very comfortable at the ball – which we will touch upon in the attacking side of the long balls – and this can also be seen in this particular example. Whilst he has enough time to do something with the ball, he’s fully aware of the press Arsenal employs on him and chooses to go long in order to give the defence a breather.

Pressing isn’t only about the man who is on the ball, but also about the pressing that occurs in the passing lanes or passing options. In that regard, playing the ball long offers more stability in the back.

In the video above, we see Crystal Palace against Arsenal. While we have seen that Mitchell and Guehi have different ways of restoring defensive shape, Andersen is the most defensive-minded and less concerned with taking time.

He gets the ball in a tighter space from his teammate and has little time to think, as Lacazette presses him aggressively on that right side. He opts to shoot the ball long and high, giving him and his defensive teammates as much time to regroup. In doing so, it’s all about time and not about progression. And that’s the difference between Mitchell and Guehi. They opt to play the ball long but also use the time to maintain a higher position on the field.

Constructing attacks

In the image above you see two long balls often played by Crystal Palace: the ball across the wide areas by the full back to an attacker who moves wide. Or, the ball goes from one central defender to the wide-area with the attacker making that same movement. Other variables than portrayed, are of course also known to happen.

Constructing attacks from ball-playing defenders happens a lot with Crystal Palace. Full backs do make runs down the line, but the direct ability to play a long ball and instantly set up the danger in the attacking third, is where Crystal Palace has had success as well.

In the video above we see Crystal Palace in their game against Arsenal. Mitchell has the ball and is not pressed, which gives him the time to look for the run of a teammate. Crystal Palace want to utilise the wide areas and that’s the attackers make a movement.

In this case, Mitchell provides a ball to the left which is received by Crystal Palace and immediately goes into the attacking shape. While Arsenal defends the ball well, it’s this kind of playing long balls that can see Crystal Palace become dangerous within seconds.

In the video above, we see another video of the game Crystal Palace vs Arsenal. What Guehi excels in, is his ability to spot an attacking player, recognise the run that the attacker does and pinpoint the pass in that direction. That’s what he does here as well.

He has time on the ball, moves to his right foot and spots the run Zaha is making. His pass is into an area where Zaha has to go to as well, which makes the pass dynamic and keeps the attack alive if Zaha receives the ball well. He does and in doing so, the ball has just gone from defensive third to attacking third with one pass. A direct passing style of play caused Arsenal all sorts of problems.

Final thoughts
Football can be played in many ways. There is no right or wrong way to play football, but it’s important to illustrate that long passes can have different uses. While most people have claimed in the past that they are part of the defensive part of play, it’s important to stress that long passes or long balls are a sign of something else: the direct passing style of play.

Crystal Palace want to attack through their direct passing and choose to have as few passes as possible to get in that final third. This can be achieved through their long balls from the back by either the central defensive duo or the full back pairing.

In defence, it’s really important as well. Playing out from the back might be more aesthetically pleasing, but in professional football, it’s all about being effective. Playing the ball long can lead to satisfying attacking results, but it also gives the defence time, space and room to reorganise their defence and strengthen it.