Fluidity in Football: Quantifying Relationism Through Spatial Data

My eyes haven’t been scrolling the social media platforms as much as I used to do a few years back. Partly because I don’t have the time anymore to do so in such frequency, and partly because many of my algorithms have become a cesspool of negativity and hate. Having said that, something I tend to follow is the way how teams play. And, I think, it comes as no surprise when I say that relationism as a style of play has been wandering around many feeds.

I’m not going to pretend I’m the expert on the coaching aspect of it and how to implement it. Neither do I think this article is going to bring forth groundbreaking results or theories. My aim with this article is to use event data to identify teams that are hybrid positional-relational or have a strong dominance of relationism in their style of play. Is it something that can only be captured by the eye and by a stroke of culture/emotion? Or can we use event data to recognise patterns and find teams that play that way?

Contents

  1. Why use event data to try and capture the playing style?
  2. Theoretical Framework
  3. Data & Methodology
  4. Results
  5. Final thoughts

Why use event data to try and capture the playing style?

Football, at its essence, is a living tapestry of player interactions constantly evolving around the central object of desire: the ball. As players move and respond to one another, distinct patterns emerge in their collective actions, particularly visible in the intricate networks formed through passing sequences.

Though traditional event data captures only moments when players directly engage with the ball, these touchpoints nonetheless reveal profound relational qualities. We can measure these qualities through various lenses: the diversity of passing choices (entropy), the formation of interconnected player clusters, and the spatial coordination that emerges as players position themselves in relation to teammates.

This approach to understanding football resonates deeply with relationist philosophy. From this perspective, the game’s meaning doesn’t reside in static positions or isolated actions, but rather in the dynamic, ever-shifting relationships between players as the match unfolds. What matters is not where individual players stand, but how they move and interact relative to one another, creating a fluid system of meaning that continuously transforms throughout the ninety minutes.

Theoretical Framework

Football style through a relationist lens isn’t defined by predetermined positions but emerges organically from player interactions. This approach, which is founded on spontaneity, spatial intelligence, and fluid connectivity, stands in contrast to positional play’s structured framework of designated zones and tactical discipline.

In relational systems, players coordinate through intuitive responses to teammates, opponents, and the ball’s context. The tactical framework materialises through the play itself rather than being imposed beforehand.

On the pitch, this manifests as continuously reforming passing triangles, compact and diverse passes, constant support near the ball, and freedom from positional constraints. Players gravitate toward the ball, creating local numerical advantages and dynamic combinations. Creative responsibility is distributed, shifting naturally with each possession phase, while team structure becomes fluid and contextual, adapting to the evolving match situation.

Analytically, traditional metrics like zone occupation or average positions presume stability and structure that relational play defies. Effective analysis requires shifting from static measurements to interaction-based indicators.

This research introduces metrics derived from event data corresponding to relational principles: clustering coefficients quantify local interaction density, pass entropy measures improvisational variety, and support the proximity index tracks teammate closeness to the ball, enabling dynamic identification of relational phases throughout matches.

Data and methodology

This study uses a quantitative methodology to identify and measure relational play in football through structured event data. The dataset includes match records from the 2024–25 Eredivisie Women’s league. Each event log contains details such as player and team identifiers, event type (e.g. pass, duel, shot), spatial coordinates (x and y values on a normalised 100×68 pitch), and timestamp. Only pass events are used in the analysis, since passing is the most frequent and structurally revealing action in football. The data comes from Opta/StatsPerform and was collected on May 1st, 2025, for the Dutch Eredivisie Women.

To capture long-term relational behaviour, each match is segmented into 45-minute windows. Each window is treated independently and analysed for signs of relational play using three custom-built metrics:

  1. Clustering Coefficient measures triangle formation frequency in passing networks, where players are nodes and passes are directed edges. A player’s coefficient is calculated by dividing their actual triangle involvement by their potential maximum. The team’s average value indicates local connectivity density—a fundamental characteristic of relational play.
  2. Pass Entropy quantifies passing variety. By calculating the probability distribution of each player’s passes to teammates, we derive their Shannon entropy score. Higher entropy indicates more diverse passing choices, reflecting improvisational play rather than predictable patterns. The team value averages individual entropies, excluding players with minimal passing involvement.
  3. Support Proximity Index evaluates teammate availability. For each pass, we count teammates within a 15-meter radius of the passer. The average across all passes reveals how consistently the team maintains close support around the ball—a defining principle of relational football that enables spontaneous combinations and fluid progression.

To combine these three metrics into one unified measure, we normalise each one using min-max scaling so they fall between 0 and 1. The resulting Relational Index (RI) is then calculated using the formula:

RI = 0.4 × Clustering + 0.3 × Proximity + 0.3 × Entropy

These weights reflect the greater theoretical importance of triangle-based interaction (clustering), followed by support around the ball and variability in pass choices.

A window is labelled as relational if its RI exceeds 0.5. For each team in each match, we compute the percentage of their 2-minute windows that meet this criterion. This gives us the team’s Relational Time Percentage, which acts as a proxy for how often the team plays relationally during a match. When averaged across multiple matches, this percentage becomes a stable tactical signature of that team’s playing style.

Results

Applying the relational framework to matches from the 2024–25 Eredivisie Women’s league revealed that relational play, as defined by the Relational Index (RI), occurs infrequently but measurably. Using 45-minute windows and a threshold of RI > 0.5, most teams displayed relational behaviour in less than 10% of total match time.

Across all matches analysed, the league-wide average was 8.3%, with few teams exceeding 15%. Based on these distributions, the study proposes classification thresholds: below 10% as “structured,” 10–25% as “relational tendencies,” and above 25% as “highly relational.” Visual inspections of high-RI segments showed dense passing networks, triangular combinations, and compact support near the ball, consistent with tactical descriptions of relational football.

In the bar chart above we can see the Eredivisie Women 2024-2025 teams and how relational their style of play is. It measures how much of the time they have played in relational principles. I have two thresholds:

  • 40% is the threshold for moderate relationism in football and those teams can be said to play relationism in their football or a hybrid style that favours relationism
  • 50% is highly relationism. From that percentage we can say a team is truly relationism in their style of play.

Now as you can see there are quite some teams that are moderate, but truly relationism is only played – according to this data – by Ajax and Feyenoord.

As you can see this in this violin plot, most of the time are in the moderate threshold, meaning that they have tendencies of relationism in their play, but not fully there. Now, if we look at one team we can see something different on how they play throughout the season. We are going with FC Twente, which is the best team of the season and arguably the best team of the past decade.

This grouped bar chart visualises FC Twente’s average Relational Index in the first and second halves of each match, using a 0.5 threshold to indicate relational play. By comparing the two bars per match, we can see whether Twente sustains, increases, or declines in relational behavior after halftime. The visualisation reveals how tactical fluidity evolves throughout matches, highlighting consistency or contrast between halves. Matches where both bars are above 0.5 suggest sustained relational intent, while large gaps may indicate halftime adjustments or fatigue. This provides insight into Twente’s game management and stylistic adherence across different phases of play.

Final thoughts

This study demonstrates that relational football—a style characterised by adaptive coordination, dense passing, and ball-near support—can be meaningfully identified using structured event data. Through a composite Relational Index, short relational phases were detected across matches, though their overall frequency was low, suggesting such play is rare or context-dependent. The model proved sensitive to fluctuations in team behaviour, offering a new lens for analysing tactical identity and match dynamics.

However, limitations include reliance on on-ball data, which excludes off-ball positioning, and the use of fixed two-minute windows that may overlook brief relational episodes. Additionally, the index’s threshold and normalisation methods, while effective, introduce subjectivity and restrict cross-match comparison. The current framework also lacks contextual variables like scoreline or pressing intensity. Despite these constraints, the findings support the claim that relational football, though abstract, leaves identifiable statistical traces, offering a scalable method for tactical profiling and a foundation for future model refinement.

Interquartile Ranges and Boxplots in Football Analysis

By writing regularly, I have concluded that I like discussing data from a sporting perspective: explaining data methodology through the lens of sport, football in particular. I have always set out to work in professional football, and I am very lucky to have reached that, but I want to keep creating, and that is why my content has become increasingly about how we use data rather than what players/teams are good/bad.

I spoke about the importance of looking at players who act differently. Well, the data behaves differently: they are outside of the average or the mean. Previously, I have spoken about outliers and anomalies; those were result-based articles. But what if we zoom in, into the methodology and look at the way we calculate those outliers or anomalies? Today, I want to talk about Interquartile Ranges in football data.

Data collection

Before I look into that, I want to shed light on the data that I am using. The data I am using focuses on the Brazilian Serie A 2025. Of course, I know that it is very early in the season and has limitations. But we can still draw meaningful insights from them.

The data comes from Opta/StatsPerform and was collected on April 22nd, 2025. The xg data comes from my model, which is generated through R. The expected goals values were generated on April 26th, 2025.

Interquartile Ranges

The interquartile range (IQR) is a key measure of statistical dispersion that describes the spread of the central 50% of a dataset. It is calculated by subtracting the first quartile (Q1) from the third quartile (Q3):

IQR = Q3 − Q1

To understand this, consider that when a dataset is ordered from smallest to largest, Q1 represents the 25th percentile (the value below which 25% of the data falls), and Q3 represents the 75th percentile (the value below which 75% of the data falls). The IQR therefore, captures the range in which the “middle half” of the data lies, excluding the extreme 25% on either end.

Interquartile Range explainer

The IQR is widely used because it is resistant to outliers. Unlike the full range (maximum minus minimum), which can be skewed by one unusually high or low value, the IQR reflects the typical spread of the data. This makes it particularly useful in datasets where anomalies or extreme values are expected, such as football statistics, where a single match can significantly distort an average.

A small IQR indicates that the data is tightly clustered around the median, suggesting consistency or low variability. A large IQR implies more variation, indicating that values are more spread out. In data analysis, comparing IQRs across different groups helps identify where variability lies and whether certain segments are more stable or volatile than others.

Box plot

A boxplot (or box-and-whisker plot) is a compact, visual summary of a dataset’s distribution, built around five key statistics: the minimum, first quartile (Q1), median (Q2), third quartile (Q3), and maximum. It is one of the most efficient ways to display the central tendency, spread, and potential outliers in a single view.

At the core of a boxplot is the box, which spans from Q1 to Q3 — the interquartile range (IQR). This box contains the middle 50% of the data. A horizontal line inside the box represents the median (Q2), showing where the center of the data lies. The whiskers extend from the box to show the range of the data that falls within 1.5 times the IQR from Q1 and Q3. Any data points outside of that range are plotted as individual dots or asterisks, and are considered outliers.

Boxplots are particularly useful for comparing distributions across multiple categories or groups. In football analytics, for example, you can use boxplots to compare metrics like interceptions, shot accuracy, or pass completion rates across different player roles or leagues. This makes it easy to identify players who consistently perform above or below the norm, assess the spread of values, and detect skewness.

An important advantage of boxplots is their resistance to distortion by extreme values, thanks to their reliance on medians and quartiles rather than means and standard deviations. However, boxplots do not reveal the full shape of a distribution (e.g., multimodality or subtle clusters), so they are best used alongside other tools when deeper analysis is needed.

Analysis

As described under the data section, I will use expected goals data from the Brazilian Serie A 2025. Using interquartile ranges, we can see which players are in the middle 50% of the selected metric.

In short, this is what we can conclude: In the 2025 Brazilian league season, Pedro Raul stood out as the top player by expected goals (xG), showing his strong attacking threat. While there is a competitive cluster behind him, his advantage highlights his key role in creating high-quality scoring opportunities.

This shows us the top performers in expected goals accumulated of the begin of the season in Brazil. But if you want to delve deeper, you can look for outliers. We do that by using the interquartile range and finding the middle 50%. If there are deviations away from that middle 50%, we can can state that they are over-/underperforming. Or, in a more extreme form: they are outliers.

I’m quite interested in their distribution: do they have many shows of low xG-value? Or rather a few with high xG-values? I want to see whether they are part of outliers or that, in general just have more high xG-values per shot.

But how can we visualise that? By looking at box plots.

Each boxplot delineates the statistical spread of shot quality, with the median value indicating the central tendency of xG per attempt, while the interquartile range (IQR) represents the middle 50% of observations, effectively illustrating the consistency of shot selection.

The median xG value serves as a primary indicator of a player’s typical shot quality, with higher values suggesting systematic access to superior scoring opportunities, often from proximal locations to the goal or advantageous tactical positions. The width of the IQR provides insight into shot selection variability — narrower distributions indicate methodological consistency in opportunity type, while broader distributions suggest greater diversity in shot characteristics.

Final thoughts

Interquartile ranges and boxplots offer robust analytical tools for examining footballers’ shot quality distributions. These methods efficiently highlight the central 50% of data, filtering outliers whilst emphasising typical performance patterns.

Boxplot visualisations concisely present multiple statistical parameters — median values, quartile ranges, and outlier identification — enabling immediate cross-player comparison. This approach reveals crucial differences in shooting behaviours, including central tendency variations, distributional width differences, and asymmetric patterns that may reflect tactical specialisation.

Despite their utility, these visualisations possess inherent limitations. They necessarily obscure underlying distributional morphology and provide no indication of sample size adequacy — a critical consideration in sports analytics where performance metric reliability depends on observation volume. A player with minimal shot attempts may produce a boxplot visually similar to one with extensive data, despite significantly reduced statistical reliability.

Ruud van Nistelrooij — PSV’s coaching profile

If you are a follower of Dutch football or the Champions League in general, you will have heard of it: Ruud van Nistelrooij is PSV’s new head coach. It was announced a few months ago, but for me it’s time to look at it more closely from a tactical perspective. What does Van Nistelrooij bring to PSV? How does he differ from his predecessor? And, what can we expect from this team and his pivotal players?

Contents

  1. Biography
  2. Jong PSV — data
  3. Jong PSV — tactics
  4. PSV — tactics
  5. Differences with Schmidt
  6. Eye for youth
  7. Final thoughts

Biography

Ruud van Nistelrooij hardly needs ian ntroduction as he was a world class player, but to sum it up:

  • Name: Ruud van Nistelrooij
  • Date of birth: 01–07–1976
  • Nationality: Dutch
  • Position: Striker (player)
  • Contract expires: 30–6–2025
  • Clubs (player): FC Den Bosch, SC Heerenveen, PSV, Manchester United, Real Madrid, Hamburger SV, Malaga
  • Clubs (coach): Dutch team assistant, PSV Youth, Dutch team assistant, Jong PSV, PSV

So what can we expect from Ruud van Nistelrooij at PSV? Most of it is based on how he let his Jong PSV side play in the Eerste Divisie. He has been labeled as a coach that has a style that mixes Bobby Robson, Diego Simeone, and Marcelo Bielsa. But how does he do that? This article hopefully is the answer to that.

Jong PSV — Data

Before we look into the tactics of Van Nistelrooij, we will look closer to what his Jong PSV side achieved in the Eerste Divisie 21/22. They ended the league on a 12th position which was fairly okay considering their average age is 19,9 years old.

Not my best data visual, I must admit — but interesting nonetheless. Jong PSV with an average age of 19.9 years old, managed to finish 12th on points. In goals scored they ranked 8th, expected goals 15th — which can be concluded as a structural overperformer in those metrics. The same goes for conceded goals vs expected goals against — more goals went in than expected.

What is important for Van Nistelrooij is that his teams are attacking teams that are dominant on the ball and dominate play from possession. In that regard, his Jong PSV side did very well with the 4th place in possession.

Jong PSV — tactics

The information on the data is very brief, but the question arises: how did Ruud van Nistelrooij accomplish this? We will take a brief look at his tactics at Jong PSV.

First of all, the build-up. For Van Nistelrooij it’s of extreme importance to have control of ball possession and making sure you always got an overload against a pressing opposition. So you are playing against a 4–2–3 or a 4–3–3, they will likely press the central defenders with their striker and their ‘10’. What PSV always wants to have in these situations is that they have one defensive playermore than the opposition — to create an overload and surpass the press. This is usually done by a midfielder dropping deep. When the opposition uses three players to press, PSV will do the build up with four defensive players — in this case it will be the back four and the midfielder will not drop deep. It also has an advantage in rest defence, because you already have a decent defensive organisation in there. It’s in this ideal of building up, he has watched Bielsa a lot.

Next step, is the conversion of ball possession to creating chances. PSV have a lot of possession but keep it long too — which can lead to non-efficient attacks. To come to chances, PSV is very reliant on the wingers to create something and for that the positioning of the backs is vital. Before we touch upon that, we have to stress that the diagonal balls from the defensive/middle third are of vital importance in this way of play/

In the image above you can see how PSV operate when they have the ball with their central defenders. Initially he full backs move up down the line in this 4–2–3–1 and the double pivot drops deep. Van Nistelrooij want his full backs to invert to allow more space for his wingers in the next attacking phase.

The reason why Van Nistelrooij does this is that he likes his full backs to operate in the half-space in a playmaker role. But, more importantly, he wants his wingers to have space to make the 1v1 and have space to dribble. If you play in these positions/roles — dribbling ability is very important to him in attack.

For a striker, it’s of great importance to make yourself available via third-man runs, but also be able to play the target man role in Jong PSV.

When entering the transition phase from attack to defence, there are a few interesting things to be seen in Jong PSV. When losing the ball, there are two task to be carried out. The first one is for most forward players to press with the intention of making sure all depth is cut out of the ball possession. The second task is for the defensive players to drop deep so that the defensive organisation is restored. This might be seen as a bit more conservative idea of play, but it also leads to the fact that counter-attacks aren’t dangerous in this approach. Defensively solid, but regaining possession in the midde third, doesn’t happen a lot.

In terms of defending when the opposition has the ball, Van Nistelrooij favours to play deeper and play man-marking. He likes pure defensive actions and the ability for defenders to stick tight to the opposition and defend their player. This again, might be considered as a slightly more traditional approach — but it also leads to the notion that Jong PSV recovers many balls in their own defensive third.

PSV — tactics

So translating this view to PSV is obviously admirable, but does it work 1-on-1? Short answer: no. Let’s have a look at how PSV likes to start. They like to start in a 4–3–3- formation in which they have three pure attackers and a three-man midfield. This midfield often consists of a single pivot (Sangare) and two attacking midfielders (Veerman and Til).

In defence, the formation changes. This is not only because of how Van Nistelrooij wants to maximise the opportunity to regain the ball, but also because of the man-marking — so the system needs to be flexible. He often changes his 4–3–3 into a 4–1–4–1 defensively, as you can see below.

The 4–1–4–1 is formed by the wingers dropping deep to assist the two attacking midfielders who become central midfielders. The defensive midfielder in this scenario will drop deeper to form a bridge between the four-man defence and the four-man midfield.

Against more attacking qualitative sides, PSV will play a 4–4–2 in defence as well. It means that Sangare will get a partner in central/defensive midfield.

The 4–4–2 is formed by the same movement of the wingers. They drop deeper to aid the double pivot or central midfield duo. In this case the attacking midfielder will go up the pitch (Til) and aid the striker. The likely scenario in the rest of the season will be that Til will help De Jong — which is going to be a very important duo up front.

So will PSV defend or press the side where the ball is. Under Schmidt there was ball oriented pressing meaning that the whole team would shift to the side where ball was. The whole team would move as an unit to one side to press and regain possession of the ball. This could be quite effective and give you ball recovery high up the pitch, but it also left you exposed on the other flank.

Van Nistelrooij does this differently as you can see in the image below.

As you can see this is different from the other approach, but this also means less risk. When the opposition comes through behind Gakpo the left full-back can go higher up the pitch to confront the player. The rest stays in their position giving it more defensive solidity and no chance of attacking quickly over the other flank with a lot of space. A big disadvantage is that the ball is less likely to be recovered in the attacking final third and it gives the opposition chance to re-organise their defences.

Going forward the vitality of the wingers is essential. As illustrated above, the build-up will frequently end with dribbling wingers who will engage in a 1v1 one with the opposition.

In the image above you see the triangle on the right side when PSV attack over the right flank. They do this with the right winger, the right full back and the ‘10’ who will drop the side where the ball is. They trie to overload a certain area and come to a chance from that play.

This we also can see in the game vs Ajax recently.

In the image above you see Ajax highlighted, but notice how PSV (in grey/black) attack from the right with their triangle. They want to gain advantage by luring Ajax to that side.

Van Nistelrooij likes his wingers to engage in 1v1s, which also means that their will be movement in the two attacking lines in the attacking third. Here we see Til and De Jong high in the box, but also Veerman and Gakpo moving up on the pitch — unmarked.

By luring the opposition to that side again, PSV opens up space in the middle because Ajax doesn’t react adequately.

The three players on the right have occupied time and space for the Ajax defenders and this means PSV can attack through the central zones and move up the pitch. This can lead to attacking, dangerous situations in which they can profit.

Strengths and weaknesses

PSV can be really dangerous through the early cross. That early cross can give the striker and the attacking midfielder a good position to score. This is often done via De Jong and Til. To do that, it’s important for the full back to give the cross while the winger will invert and come into the central zones, ideally zone 14.

One of the major vulnerabilities is how PSV act when they lose the ball. As we have seen previously, the moment of ball recovery is mostly in the defensive third. This can be good when the opposition starts the build-up from the back, but when the ball is lost in the central zones and in the middle third, this gives problems for the defence. PSV has a really good defensive midfielder in Sangare, but when Veerman or Van Ginkel lose the ball in the central areas — the counterattack can lead to very dangerous situations. It’s something we have seen in pre-season and in the recent games against Monaco. Partly it’s because they are used to ball-oriented press and that a loss of the ball doesn’t mean a dangerous situation. But with the system Van Nistelrooij employs — this is exactly such a liability.

Van Nistelrooij speaks a lot about rest-defence and in those situations, the rest-defence isn’t properly utilised. When losing the ball on the flanks, the rest-defence is organised quite well, but in situations where it happens in the central zones against a quick, direct opposition — this leaves big questions. The defence is one of the most vulnerable aspects of this PSV side, so the rest-defence should be optimal to combat any threat through the middle.

Differences with Schmidt

The core difference between Schmidt and van Nistelrooij is that Van Nistelrooij goes back to more conservative values in terms of ball possession. Where Schmidt played a 4–2–2–2 with high ball-oriented press to get the ball in the attacking third, Van Nistelrooij is about being dominant with and on the ball, longer sequences of possession and only using one particular player that is tasked with regaining possession of the ball.

That difference is noticed with the players who are in a transition phase, especially in midfield. Chasing the ball instead of trusting the system to handle it defensively, has put PSV in some difficult situations — but with a few weeks time, I think this transition will be dealt with.

A keen eye for Jong PSV

Van Nistelrooij has a keen eye for the youth of Jong PSV, having worked with a few of them. Due to the unfortunate injury of Madueke, he has been forced to play more inexperienced players such as Bakayoko and Saibari, of which the latter has shown his potential a bit more — but both youngsters are doing quite well so far.

Given the fact that Van Nistelrooij has worked with Young PSV and with the U19s, he knows the culture of the academy as well as what the new prospects might be. That knowledge can help him in the long term going forward.

Final thoughts

It’s hard to tell how good Van Nistelrooij as a coach is. He has clear ideas of how he wants to progress, what roles and profiles he needs in his squad and the philosophy of football he wants to play. In many ways, he is the opposite of Schmidt and that means a lot of adapting by the players. We have seen that they are transitioning and are quite vulnerable in defensive situations — especially against Monaco.

But, if key players like Gakpo and Sangare stay in Eindhoven, with the arrival of Luuk de Jong and the talent in various areas on the pitch — this could be a very exciting season for PSV. It’s hard to say if they can compete with Ajax in the long run, but PSV can challenge — although Feyenoord will be a worthy adversary as well. It seems that Van Nistelrooij can grow in his role and in 2–3 seasons time, this might be a title-winning manager.

Mitchell van der Gaag — Excelsior years

Manchester United have employed Erik ten Hag as manager of the first team. There has been said and written enough about Ten Hag, but he is not coming alone. Alongside him, Steve McClaren and Mitchell van der Gaag have joined the Manchester club. Especially the latter hasn’t been explored too much by the broader public, and that’s why I’m writing this analysis.

In this analysis, I will look at the Portuguese influences on his managerial/coaching approaches, his defensive qualities, and his impressive coaching period at Excelsior Rotterdam during 2016–2018.

Portuguese influence

Mitchell van der Gaag did his UEFA C and B in the Netherlands but managed to do his UEFA A and UEFA Pro in Portugal. And, that’s where the difference is quite noticeable. While in the Netherlands, learning to coach is focused on problem-solving, in Portugal Van der Gaag learned to adopt, adapt and improve.

In Portugal, it’s more based on learning from experts. Experienced coaching comes from learning from experienced coaches while learning from being together with other coaches. In that way, you take lessons from those coaches and you take what you think is important from them.

Defensive qualities

To be able to properly defend, that’s a true art form. Defending is an art, but in different defensive situations, different solutions are applied. Taking from the Portuguese approach, the field can divided in three different thirds:

The idea of defending learned by Van der Gaag in Portugal is that you clear everything that comes in the red zone. No build-up, but only clear the ball and make sure the ball is out of that zone.

That’s not something required in the modern game but has lead Van der Gaag to a fundamental truth. Football isn’t one way or the other, it’s a pragmatic game and in some situations, you need to clear balls. In others, you need to play out from the back.

According to Van der Gaag, a defensive organisation is the foundation of every successful team. We will see how he did that with Excelsior.

Tactics at Excelsior Rotterdam 2017–2018

Excelsior is relatively small club and whenever they are in the Eredivisie, it’s all about survival. Now defending is so much more than just clearing balls as what I have shown you above, but in terms of playing a defensive style of play in the Eredivisie — clearing balls is a big part of it. It all depends on the quality of your players. When the opposition does press high and aggressively, playing out for the back is only for the players with a certain amount of technique and pace in their actions. These are usually not found in the bottom half teams in the Eredivisie. That’s the pragmatic approach from Van der Gaag.

Having been very successful in attack with Belenenses and getting promotion to the Primeira Liga in Portugal, the approach with Excelsior should all be about defensive organisation.

He was very successful in his way of approaching games at Excelsior, leading them to a 12th and 11th place in the Eredivisie table, but in this piece, we will mainly focus on his tactics in the 2017–2018 season.

Formation

Van der Gaag sees the formation of a team as a starting point for the team, because it can’t change quite often. In the 2017–2018 season he used the 4–2–3–1 formation 76% of the time.

4–2–3–1 in possession

The 4–2–3–1 consisted of a back four of Fortes-De Wijs-Mattheij-Karami with a double pivot of Kool-Faik. The double-pivot was quite interesting as both players can be considered as playmakers and more of natural 8s or 10s, rather than 6s. The attacking midfield consisted of wide midfielders Bruins and Elbers, who both had different roles. Messaoud was the attacking midfielder and Van Duinen was the sole striker.

The 4–2–3–1 in possession often changed into a sort of 4–2–2–2, with Bruin inverting to the midfield and Messaoud going wider to the right. Van Duinen would leave his striker position and move to the left flank, while Elbers would assume the striker role.

The formation would change when the ball was lost and the transition would occur.

When the ball was lost, Excelsior usually defended in a 4–4–2 formation. This meant that #10 Messaoud joined Van Duinen in a two-strikers system. Bruins and Elbers dropped deep to join the double pivot and form a 4-man midfield. The defence and the midfield would play close to each other in order to leave little space in between the lines.

At some moments, the formation in defence would even become a 4–5–1. This meant that Koolwijk dropped down to the defence and became the third central defender. In doing so, he left space in the double pivot, which was then filled in by Messaoud, who dropped. Van Duinen was the sole striker in this formation.

Attack

The thing with a defensive organisation is that you try to play from your defence. In other words, the defensive organisation should be solid and when you attack it should be direct, in order to not disturb your defensive organisation. Excelsior did this with playing Van Duinen up top and letting him be the holding player. The ball needed to be controlled just long enough for other people to progress on the pitch.

This can also be seen in the game against Willem II. Van Duinen drops very deeps, but drags defenders with him and allows the attacking midfielders to progress on the pitch. Bruins will go into wide area on the right, while Messaoud in the middle will go to the penalty area, anticipating a cross.

The long ball is important to be direct, but even when pressing the shape of the three players is maintained. Van Duinen presses the player on the ball and gets possession of the ball. After that, Messaoud immediately moves forward into the penalty area, while Faik remains available for passing. In doing so they can move forward with pace, but still have options going forward.

In the image above you can Excelsior in their game against VVV-Venlo in the Eredivisie. The direct passing style does suit the direct approach by Van der Gaag. In just two passes he sets the full back up for a cross. The central defender passes to the inverting and dropping wide midfielder. In doing so, Garcia opens space for a run down the line for right back Karami. In just a few touches and movements, Excelsiors opens up play in the middle to the final third. Faik and Koolwijk assume their positions and stay there, in order to make sure the rest-defence is maintained.

In a slightly more advanced situation against VVV-Venlo we see how the unit of three midfielders stays conservative in the middle third, while Van Duinen has dropped and claimed the ball. Right back Karami has advanced and is a good option for Van Duinen to pass the ball to.

What’s interesting here is that two attacks up top, are the two wide midfielders/wingers who have inverted to attack an eventual cross from the right flank. The idea is that from this moment on, two or three touches are needed to come to a goalscoring opportunity.

Defence

We have seen how Mitchell van der Gaag constructs his attacks or wants to come to goalscoring opportunities, but how does his team portray themselves in the defensive phases of the game? How does he make sure the opportunities are kept to a minimum?

Here you can see how Excelsior try to defend with four people as a unit and move toward the player with the ball. Ball-oriented marking. In this instance against Ajax, they try to do that in order to isolate Huntelaar, who likes to play between the lines.

In the image above you can see how deep the two defensive lines defend to make sure Ajax has as little chance to be successful. The defence is usually 4–4–2 or 4–5–1, but in this instance, it’s a 4–4–1–1 formation, as Messaoud is marking Ziyech here.

In the game above you can see how the two defensive lines are deep and making sure the Heerenveen players are covered well. This means that there is an 8v4 overload from Excelsior. With Messaoud pressing the player on the ball, the progression of this attack is made more difficult.

In this game, we see how NAC on the break as Excelsior need to transition to their defensive shapes. As you can see the back four remains intact, and the midfield consists of three players initially, but they are positioned in a way that the defensive capabilities of Excelsior are favoured.

What will he bring to Manchester United?

Van der Gaag is a very strong defensive-minded coach. He will focus and improve the defensive lines and will make sure it’s not only based on theories but will make it pragmatic. He believes in a personal approach and will talk with the players concerned, getting to know them and giving them the motivation to give it everything.

He is a talented coach who knows the differences between winning trophies, developing young squads and fighting against relegation. This experience in defending will prove to be of a vital part of Erik ten Hag’s management of Manchester United.

ERIK TEN HAG AT FC UTRECHT: AN ELITE COACH IN THE MAKING

With Erik ten Hag set to be appointed the next Manchester United manager, I thought it would be a good idea to look at Ten Hag’s experience in the Eredivisie. Now, everyone has looked at his Ajax tenure – rightly so. But, I wanted to focus on his period at FC Utrecht which shaped him into an elite manager.

In this article, I will look at three different aspects of what he achieved and changed while at FC Utrecht:

  1. Professionalism
  2. Transfers
  3. Tactics
  4. Final thoughts

Before I get into that I wanted to say that the data in this article are from Wyscout. Furthermore, it’s important to stress that FC Utrecht isn’t a small club in the Netherlands. They have won the Dutch Cup three times as well as the Supercup once. Their ambition is to consistently qualify for the European play-offs in the Eredivisie as well as pose a threat to the big 4 (Ajax, AZ, Feyenoord, PSV).

Ten Hag has moved into the top, step by step. His managerial career started at Go Ahead Eagles where he achieved promotion to the Eredivisie. After that, he went to Bavaria and coached Bayern München II, before he returned to the Netherlands and coached FC Utrecht. His experience in Germany and his ambition made sure FC Utrecht started to develop on and off the pitch.

PROFESSIONALISM

It’s a bit extreme to call FC Utrecht a sleeping giant, but there is a massive potential to get good results in the league. This doesn’t only depend on what happens on the pitch, but you need to create the right context and environment for professional athletes to thrive. So how did Ten Hag do that at FC Utrecht?

First of all, he changed the training quantity. The first team was required to train more than once per day and the intensity would be higher in the training sessions. With that notion, the club also would track what the players were eating as Ten Hag firmly believes that every aspect of professional life should be of high quality. This also translates into the analysis department of the club. It was instrumental for his way of preparing that he could see event data translated into analysis, so he could track the players’ movements, decision making and on-ball activity.

In addition to this, there also was the matter of the training grounds – especially the pitches. They were taken care of by the municipality, but this changed as Ten Hag wanted professional groundsmen and the control that the club took care of the grounds. All this feeds into the change of mentality Ten Hag wanted to achieve at FC Utrecht. With Ten Hag you need to have the mentality to win every game and even if you win games, you always have to be critical of your own performance.

TRANSFERS

Transfers 15/16

In the summer of 2015, Ten Hag became head coach of FC Utrecht and in his first season, we saw two distinct things. First, he cut a lot of dead weight. Players who were earning too much or just simply weren’t good enough. As you can see on the outgoing transfers, 15 players exited the club during the whole season, with 12 players leaving in the summer.

He did attract a few players who became instrumental like Strieder, Letschert and Haller. Now Haller was already on loan with Utrecht, so he can’t really take the credit for that. In regards to what English media have said about not giving youth a chance, that’s utter codswallop. Ramselaar, Amrabat and Joosten all were included in the squad.

Finished 11th in the 2014/2015 season, Ten Hag did really well in his first season – finishing 5th and qualifying for the domestic play-offs for European football.

Transfers 16/17

In his second season, we see another shift in losing dead weight, majority of the players simply is’t good enough or their contracts have run out. However, a difference from a season earlier is that Ten Hag also has sold some of their most important players – as they have done exceptionally well. In selling Ramselaar, Letschert and Boymans – they have generated over €9 million for those three players.

If we compare that to incoming players they have only spent €500,000 on new players (Van der Meer, Jensen), the rest came on a free, from the academy or was loaned from another club.

Another relatively successful transfer period and it resulted in a good position in the league as well. As they finished 5th in the 2015/2016 season, they now finished even higher on the 4th place in the table.

TACTICS

Before we move into the actual analysis of the tactics and style of play, I will place the analysis into context. I’m going to have a look at the 2016/2017 season for a number of reasons. It’s the highest finish in the league under Ten Hag, his style of play was seen throughout the squad and it was the season that attracted Ajax to his coaching style.

There are different components to analyse:

  1. Formation
  2. Defensive play
  3. Attacking play
  4. Counter-attacks
  5. Data
  6. The progress in the importance of full backs FC Utrecht -> Ajax

Formation

Ten Hag’s most used formations in this particular season were the 4-3-1-2/4-4-2 (51%), 4-3-3 (18%) and the 3-4-1-2 (10%). This depends on the opposition of course, but what’s good to understand is that he didn’t want the traditional Dutch school of attacking football. He wanted to maximise results and is very pragmatic in his approach in doing so, therefore being different to most coaches in 2015-2017 in the Netherlands.

This 4-3-1-2 can also be classified as a 4-4-2, depending on the position of Barazite. Often he played more like a #10 and closer to the strikers and it became a 4-3-1-2 with three central midfielders – with Brama a bit deeper. But when you play with a midfield square you Brama as the defensive midfielder and Barazite as the attacking midfielder, with Ayoub-Amrabat providing support in linking the defence to attack.

That 4-4-2 could also easily become a 4-3-3 with Barazite playing as a striker with Haller and Kerk on the flanks. The role of the two strikers is important for their dynamic play. While Haller is strong in the air and has good link-up play, Kerk is agile, versatile, and strong. These two players complement each other in attack and have enough ability to set up the midfielders as well.

Defensive play

So what does the defensive structure look like under Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht? I think it’s worth noting that he doesn’t do this in the traditional Dutch sense. He likes to keep it compact and we can see a few interesting things in how he sets it up. He only has the full backs in the wide areas and most of the player (6) are situated in the half spaces.

Full backs in wide areas, rest compact in central zones

In the image above you can see the defensive set up. One of the interesting parts is that the #10 will go into the striker position when FC Utrecht is in the pressing shape. In doing so it enables the #1o to help the two strikers who assume the winger positions without the ball and do the pressing as such. This means that the first pressing moment is done by a winger (Haller/Kerk) and Barazite will press the goalkeeper when he receives the ball. Ten Hag wants to press with three attackers. This means that one will press the central defender on the ball, the striker will press the goalkeeper and the third defender will remain close to the other central defender, to block the passing lane:

Pressing with strikers

In the image above you see how this has been done with the three attackers pressing. First, the winger presses the RCB who can only pass without risk to the keeper in his eyes because the passing lane is blocked to the RB. The defensive midfielder is an option, but he will be pressed too. As soon as the keeper has the ball, the striker will press the goalkeeper who can only play it long.

The two strikers do not only position themselves to be ready for the transition but they are actively involved in the defensive process. This means that attackers are expected to have defensive qualities as well under Ten Hag. They need to block passing lanes, track back and make sure to stand in between the central defenders and full backs. Ten Hag sees it as follows: you attack with the collective and you defend with the collective.

In general, Ten Hag didn’t press aggressively with Utrecht, but as soon as the opposition got into the position in the middle third, they would be marked closely and attempted to win the ball there as it gives advantages in transition (see counter-attack). Again, there is a vital role to play for the #10 in following a central defender who steps out. If a central defender moves up the pitch and attempts to progress via a carry or pass, the #10 Barazite will follow in order to limit the threat, while the two attackers will assume their original role.

Attacking play

For Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht there was one thing most important: attacking through dominance in the central zones. Bar the two full backs, everyone is in these central zones. The reason for that is that the LB and RB create more space for the central midfielders in the central zones, which is vital for the build-up.

Attacking options via central midfielders

So how does Ten Hag construct attacks using the left and right central midfielders? In this case the left central midfielder was Ayoub and the right central midfielder was Amrabat. There are two scenario’s in how they conduct the build-up and be as direct as possible.

The first one is where a central defender reaches Ayoub. In this case, left central defender Janssen, passes the ball to Ayoub who has assumed the position away from the half-space and come into the wide area. He stretches play, creating more space in the central zones in doing so. Then, he has two options. He can opt to play in the feet of Haller on the left side or he can play it in space where Kerk has to make a run. Haller needs to connect with other players to create a chance, while the option for Kerk will mean a shooting opportunity.

The second one is where a central defender opts for the right central midfielder option. This is less direct as the one mentioned above. The central defender plays to the defensive midfielder (Brama) who has dropped deeper. He will pass to Amrabat (RCM) and then he will connect with the attackers. Instead of playing it direct and straight, he will opt to play a ball behind the defence, utilising Kerk’s pace. At the same time, Haller moves to the far post in order to await a cross. The role of #10 is to cover the ground behind Kerk in terms of making sure transitions will be less dangerous.

In the image above you can see how the #10 Barazite acts with his through passes in case of ball possession in the final third. There are two different options. Important here is that Haller is not involved in the receiving of the through ball, as he isn’t equiped to make that run needed.

The first option is to pass in a straight line towards the penalty spot. Kerk will lose his marker and make a run inwards to get in the ideal position to shoot. The second option is to pass the ball to the right, where the RCM Ambarat will make a run between the defenders and enter the box from the right side. This could prove a good shooting opportunity, but also a good passing option as both Kerk and Haller will make a run to the far post.

Above you can see how the attackers react to cross from Amrabat from the right half space. Barazite willl move into the box on the right, while both Kerk and Haller will move to the far post zone, to attack the cross. Amrabat and Troupee stay on the right, to create space in the central zones – and there is where it has to happen for Ten Hag.

Counter-attack

In Ten Hag’s vision for FC Utrecht, he most likely wanted to regain possession in the middle third. In doing so, the positioning of the attacking midfielder(s) is absolutely vital going forward. In this case, it’s Barazite. He is instrumental in the counter-attack set out by Ten Hag.

In the image above you see the situation when there’s a counter-attack after regaining possession by the LB. Earlier we spoke about the 4-3-3 in defence, but as soon as the ball is further on the pitch – Barazite will drop deeper. After the ball is regained in the wide area by the LB, Barazite will move up the pitch and assume a position between the lines. In doing so he can adjust correctly and pass the ball to either striker. Because the strikers are playing in the half-space they can move to the wing or invert, which gives the defenders problems and FC Utrecht options on the break.

When the ball is regained in the middle third by the midfielders, everything is set to be played directly. This often occurs with Amrabat and he has two options, play it straight to Barazite or play it long behind the defence for Kerk. Again, Haller will make a run towards the far post to anticipate a cross.

Statistics

So how well did Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht score on the different statistics during the 2016/2017 season where they finished 4th? You can see that in the images below. (There is an issue with the quality of images showing on the website, click on image and open in another tab for higher quality)

In the graphs above you see how FC Utrecht scored in the shots per 90 metrics compared to the other teams in the Eredivisie 2016/2017. FC Utrecht scores 9th on the number of shots per 90. Below that you see the graph of expected goals per 90. FC Utrecht scores 4th in this metric, which does suggest they take most of their chances

But how do they do when shooting, what is the quality of those shots? In other words, what the expected goals number per shot taken?

You can see that FC Utrecht has the highest xG per shot in the Eredivisie. They are 9th on the shots per 90, but when they come in shooting positions – they do this in the most optimal positions/situations in relation to the other teams in the 2016/2017 Eredivisie. Ten Hag wants to use his attacking play to maximise the chance of scoring a goal. His idea was to limit the shots from outside the box and move into more certain positions of scoring – this resulted in the high xG per shot, as shown above.

On the goalscoring front, they were 5th with 1,54 goals per 90 – with only Feyenoord, Ajax, PSV and AZ scoring more per 90 minutes. It indicated they are doing very well in attack, making sure they are in the right positions and capitalising on those goalscoring opportunities.

How did Ten Hag’s FC Utrecht do in defence? We use the metrics of conceding shots, expected goals and goals to review this.

In the graph above you can see that has the 4th fewest shots against per 90 minutes. Only Ajax, Feyenoord and PSV concede fewer shots per 90. The strongest defences in the leagues conceded the fewest chances, but how many goals are they expected to concede? This measures the quality of the chances given away.

The quality of the chances conceded corresponds with the shots against per 90 minutes. FC Utrecht has the 4th fewest expected goals against per 90 minutes. This strongly indicates that their defence has been pretty solid. This also can be seen in the goals conceded per 90: 1,07. This was the 4th best in the data of the 2016/2017 season.

It’s interesting to see the data because they had a very good second season under Ten Hag. They were better than AZ and only the traditional top 3 (Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV) were better than this FC Utrecht side. A very impressive achievement.

Players’ reception of Ten Hag’s philosophy

When Ten Hag came into the FC Utrecht management, players were rather sceptical of his ideas. He changed a lot within the club, but most of all it was his way of coaching during training sessions. The obvious question was: what does this way of working do for us?

With the way of coaching, it can be seen as follows. Ten Hag uses a lot of moments during situations with a training session or drill to coach players. He often stops play and coaches what he wants to see and that will lead to friction sometimes. He has spoken about it in Dutch media and no player really likes it. But if the methods start to pay dividends in the games, players accept them because in the end, they want to win.

The reason why Ten Hag does this is that he wants the team to control multiple systems and that requires a lot of detail and attention from the coaching staff. But he has also admitted that too much of this way of coaching and the freedom of creativity can be lost – while that is very important for certain types of players.

The way he tries to avoid those problems is not to say what has to happen in the situations he stops play, but to ask questions. He does this to activate the brain of the players and that they are aware of the thought process behind it. Being transparent in why he demands these things of his players, is where players will accept it more.

For Ten Hag, it’s about giving context to every possible situation that can happen on the pitch and teaching the players about risk management. Because in the game, the players have to judge the risk of their actions themselves.

Players don’t need to enjoy everything they do on the training pitch, but they need to understand why they are doing it. That creates understanding and acceptance. For that to happen communication is vital and that’s what Ten Hag has done very well.

The evolution of Ten Hag’s full backs

Being FC Utrecht, there are always a few games per season that you will be the lesser team. The games against Ajax, AZ, PSV, and Feyenoord are very difficult matches and one can expect to drop points. Ten Hag has shown his pragmatism here and has employed a 5-3-2 on occasion to make sure defensive display is the priority.

When he made the step to Ajax this changed. You are expected to win everything and as a consequence, the view of the game will change as well. Ten Hag had to adapt to the stature and philosophy of Ajax and I think this is an interesting point as many critical pundits have shared their feelings about it. We have seen above that at FC Utrecht, Ten Hag wanted to create from the central zones and the positioning and actions of the full backs were in aid of that. They stood wide to create more space in the central zones, but this had to change at Ajax.

He was expected to play an attacking style of football that saw wingers in the wide areas as they play with three attackers. Keep the field wide to stretch the opponent and use the wingers to provide danger into the box. This also meant a change in the role of the full backs.

He had to adapt and there’s been a lot written already about it. I suggest you have a look at this thread by Jamie Scott. He analyses in great detail what Manchester United can expect from Erik ten Hag based on his Ajax tenure. Especially the (over) reliance on full backs is worth the read, as it’s something that’s different from his FC Utrecht period.

📌 Erik ten Hag to Manchester United [thread]:
– ten Hag’s Principles of Play at Ajax
– Strengths and Complexities of the System
– Suitability for the Premier League and United’s Squad pic.twitter.com/tfJO3paxDN— Jamie Scott (@JamiescottUV) March 22, 2022

FINAL THOUGHTS

Erik ten Hag came into international media due to his excellent European exploits with Ajax. But this wasn’t the beginning of his success. The promotion to the Eredivisie with Go Ahead Eagles, his successful spell with Bayern München II and of course his time at FC Utrecht, made him what he is today.

At FC Utrecht he has shown how to elevate a club from mid-table to sub top, whilst competing for European tickets as well. He has taken a squad, cut the dead weight and taken to the transfer market combined with academy players. His distinct style of play, his professional mentality throughout the whole club and consistency in performances – have formed him and prepared him for the Ajax job. The progression from FC Utrecht to Ajax is important to understand what he can do for Manchester United.

Sources:

Tussen de Linies
Voetbaltrainer
VI Pro

Case study men’s football Italy: Defending with a 3-1-4-2 in the Italian Primavera

I love to make these analyses of case studies and in this piece I will look at the Italian Primavera or the U19 games of men’s football in Italy. I’ve studied 17 clubs across different levels in the Primavera.

Why Primavera?
Why the Primavera? This has everything to do with academy football. They are the highest youth teams in Italy and they demonstrate a playing philosophy that has been nearly perfected and that should be reflected by the first team. The difference is that a first team MUST get results, while an academy team is a lot about development and growth of a player. That’s the main reason why I wanted to look into the primavera.

So I specifically concentrated on teams playing a 3-1-4-2. This could be read as 3-5-2, but the reason why I made this distinction is because of the role of the single pivot or defensive midfielder.

In possession

With the ball the teams playing a 3-1-4-2 had a very clear structure. They had three central defenders, two wing backs and a very distinct playing defensive midfielder. Two advances midfielders or two number ’10’s – and of course the two strikers. In the image below you can see how they typically were set up

As you can see in the image above, they are lined up against a 4-4-2 (which is not exactly typical in Italian football, but used a lot for training purposes). The back three us playing close to each other and what was important for the teams playing with the back three, was that the left central defender and the right central defender, were confident on the ball and they were tasked with playing passes through the middle to the advanced midfielders.

In possession, the two wing-backs played high up the pitch, in the middle third. They contribute to the attack via receiving passes, making runs down the line and providing crosses into the box from the flank. The strikers would attack these and try to score from these crosses.

The defensive midfielder would play a little bit more conservative. He would distribute passes forward and pick out key passes or through passes, but remained on his position. This was needed as he was tasked with organising rest-defence and being the first player to break the attack. A solid rest-defence of four players was often a required principle of the teams researched.

Out of possession

When the opponents have the ball and advance from the middle third to the defensive third, the 3-1-4-2 has transformed into a 6-2-2 formation, which give a very compact defensive line.

As you can see in the image above, the opponent has advances and change to a 4-2-4 formation, which mean that the team researched needed to create majority in defence to win the direct duels. They have been doing that by dropping deep with their back three, as you can see.

The defensive midfielder drops deep and plays very close to the back three in order to create a 4v2 in the middle. The wing backs also have dropped deep and play on the same line as the defensive midfielder – effectively making it a 6-man defence which gives them a superiority of six against the four attackers of the opponent.

The two advances midfielders also drop and support the defence, but at the same time look at the defensive midfielders of the opponent in case they want to progress on the field. The two strikers become detached from each other with one striker staying high and the other dropping a bit more in his shadow.

Transition from attack to defence

Of course you have a transition phase from attack to defence and defence to attack, but I thought the transition from attack to defence was particularly interesting. The 3-1-4-2 advanced on the pitch with the three central defenders positioned in the middle third.

As soon as they lost the ball you had four players moving a direction to try to regain possession of the ball.

As you can in the image below, a few things have changed from the 3-1-4-2 when the ball is lost in the attacking third. The wing backs have to trail back in order to assist the defence and make sure the four-man attack of the opponent can’t progress too much.

The defensive ‘diamond’ – consisting of the three central defenders and the defensive midfielder – changes into a four-man defence. The central duo is formed by the middle central defender and the defensive midfielder.

The left central defender and right central defender leave their position and go press the wide-midfielders of the opponent in order to regain possession of the ball or draw them into making mistakes. This looks like a 4-4-2 just when they lost the ball, but eventually changes into the 6-2-2 as we have seen above.

Final thoughts

It was great to see that a lot of Primavera teams played with three at the back with a defensive midfielder, but what was surprising to me was the fact that played with six at the back in the defensive phase of play when the opponent attacked with three or more attackers. This might not be exactly the case in the first team, but to me it was a sign that the defensive art of play still is living in Italy.

Case study Northern-Ireland: Roles in the 5-3-2 formation in U18’s

A few of you might know this, but I have done a year abroad in Northern-Ireland. Belfast to be more specific. While studying abroad I’ve learnt a lot about the history of the region I’ve been, the religious difficulties and violence, and about the customs of the specific area I was located. While I could talk about these things for ages, I wanted to talk about my experiences with Northern-Irish football. This is a football blog after all.

I’ve previously written about case studies in the Netherlands concentrating on inverted full backs, ball playing central defenders, zonal marking in set pieces, and the 4-3-3 & 4-2-3-1 formation. While I’ve finished the case study in the Netherlands, I wanted to have a look at Northern-Ireland as it has shaped me as a coach. In this analysis I will look at the 5-3-2 that was employed against a 4-4-2/

In this analysis I will focus on what I’ve observed in the games I’ve seen in the U18’s league. This might be different to what senior sides do and the decisions made in attack, defence and transition can therefore be different than what is best, but this analysis looks at what happened.

5-3-2
Formations are not set in stone throughout the match, but often are starting points at the beginning of a half or when a set-piece is taken. Formations are fluid as we can see in maps with average positions. The idea of position versus zones is a debate you can have, but in theory a 5-3-2 can broken down in the following: 5 defenders, 3 midfielders and 2 attackers.

Often a 5-3-2 is a defensive state and it become a 3-5-2, but in the games I’ve observed at the time, this was not the case. This was a 5-3-2, that changed a little bit during the attacking phase of the game, but it was no 3-5-2 with 5-3-2 in the defensive phase in the game and that has all to do with the roles of the lateral defenders.

Full backs or wing backs

In the image above you see a 3-5-2 formation with wing backs. These two players have a very specific role going forward and dropping deep. In defence this 3-5-2 become a 5-3-2 and in attack this become a 3-3-4 in most cases I’ve seen.

In the 5-3-2 I’ve observed there was always a back-five with an individual role of a full back to go high up the pitch into the middle third, but no higher than that. The rule in going foward was: only one of the full backs could higher up the pitch, the other would play deep – which in some case could result to a 4-4-2 in formation or 4-3-3 with a deep-lying #10.

Midfield trio

The midfield consists of three players. In the games I’ve observed there were two different scenarios:

  • Scenario #1: There was a double pivot of two defending midfielders with an attacking midfielder playing more advanced. This attacking midfielder had the role of a #10 and would play closer to the two strikers when the team was in possession and in the attacking third.
  • Scenario #2: There were two midfielder lying deep, but they were not a classic double pivot. The two deep-lying midfielders consist of a defensive midfielder + a central midfielder. That central midfielder moves along with the phases of play. In defence he plays deep and more defensively and in attack he moves to a more advances position, close to the #10.

In defence the double pivot would drop so that there would be a clear number of defensive-minded player. In reality there would be seven players defending with three attacking-minded players.

Strikers

Evidently this system plays with two strikers. In the images I’ve included in this piece, the strikers are not playing close to each other and have space between them. This is done intentionally as they were not classic strikers, but neither were they wingers. These players had the task to win the duels, hold on to the ball and move to a certain flank in order to create space in the middle and on the other flank. The other striker and attacking midfield could then move forward and create danger in front of goal. In this system, the two ‘strikers’ were identical in their role and in their style of play.

Another way of playing was when the two strikers played close to each other, but they had different qualities to bring to the game. There was one striker who was big, strong in the air and very good in holding the ball. The other striker was quicker, more agile and made more runs into specific areas to compliment the qualities of the first striker. This dynamic was supported by the attacking midfielder when he moved more up the pitch.

Allow freedom on the flanks

The main issue with the use of full backs instead of wing backs in the 5-3-2 is the freedom on the flanks. Because of the nature of the lateral defenders, pressing high up the opponent’s half or even in the middle third, is not really feasible. Thus, it is easy for the opponents to advance with wide midfielders and/or wingers. Because of the five-man defence they are dealt with quite easily, but it leaves the opponent too much freedom to dominate the game.

I gained valuable experience researching this system in Northern-Ireland. Like I said, it has shaped me as a coach and made me think of the benefits of a three-man central defence. Obviously there are flaws to this system and perhaps the use of wing backs or employing a 3-5-2 is essential, but it was great to see this being used in the U18’s.

*The tactical images are made with Tactical Pad, which gave me the freedom to alter the pitch just like I wanted to.

Mental health in football academies

I’ve been sitting on this particular topic for quite some time now. Why? Well, my experiences do tell me that the topic of mental health is a rather difficult one in the football industry. I mean, it’s very difficult to talk about, but the conservative values of the football industry can make it rather painful. Other than used as a marketing tool, the topic of mental health is not something people in the industry like to talk about.

A few years ago I was talking to an academy coach who made the remark that if I struggle with depression or something like that, I am not fit for a job in elite football. At the time this had a great impact on what I was doing and really thought this was the truth. It discouraged me of going further into the coaching world and I do have regrets that I let that particular comment get the best of me, for I am a much stronger person that that comment might suggest.

If you are reading this and you have interacted with me before, you might know that I have been diagnosed with several mental illnesses, with Bipolar Disorder and OCD being the ones that are more present in my day to day life. This means that I will go through crippling anxiety almost every day of my life combined with the extreme highs and extreme lows of bipolar disorder. This post is obviously not solely about me, but in the past I have let my mental illness – willingly and unwillingy – dictate what I was going to in life. I have certain qualities in scouting and analysis, and I’m sure to some extent, I would make a decent coach. But in some ways, I have never reached my full potential. There’s a quote by William Shakespeare that describes it best to me:

Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win, by fearing to attempt

Now the main reason that I wanted to write about this particular topic is that I want to share what it means to live with a certain mental illness, to create understanding of how deep it might go. And another reason is that we as coaches, analyst, medical staff and scouts can attribute to the better conditions surrounding mental health.

My mental health

Talking about mental health is very important if you ask me. Personally it has helped me to find a balance in my life, but it was no smooth walk in the park. Coming to terms with your mental illness(es) is quite the difficult quest. It took me a while and I had to go through very low places with people who were intentionally and unintentionally toxic in my environment.

At a point in my life I started to think about the way I felt about myself and of life in general. I started to question my behaviour and wondered if this sadness or frustration or extreme, intense feelings that I had were different from normal. The only thing that made me act upon my suspicions was time. Like the song Time by Pink Floyd. All those feelings I had were there constantly and consistenly, which led me to believe this wasn’t normal.

But what does normal even mean? And what does it mean to be different to what’s normal? These are fair questions that I only now know to answer correctly. I felt different at the time and still do, but instead of accepting that it’s okay to not be standard, I thought of myself as a freak. I was abnormal and I felt very negative about that. That negative feeling turnt into the feeling of not belonging. At that time I thought of hard boundaries, instead of that those boundaries were constructed by society, which is changing all the time. Like an organism.

At this point I was incredibly insecure, sad, angry and most of all: I was really, really confused. Confused at everything and anything. This confusion and mental illness can be horrible, debilitating, disrupting, isolating and quite frankly can make you even worse. The feeling of not understanding and now knowing what was going on in my life definitely made me worse and consequently led me into very deep depression. It almost meant the end of me. It’s only when my GP and I saw the severity of the situation, that I started to get professional help. Now, I think it’s important to stress that professional help can give you a lot points to work on or guide you in the right direction, as does medication. But in my humble opinion, I think that most of the recovery or progress is made by the willingness of oneself.

My first professional mental health counselor said that I was textbook depressed and anxious. I got the diagnoses Depression, OCD and Anxiety Disorder. This relieved me of the pain of not knowing, but still the not understanding part was there. The confusion was still there. What does this mean for me? Am I ill? This confusion grew because I was diagnosed a couple of more times. It took everyone two years and 8 months to come to the conclusion that I had Bipolar Disorder. From that moment on, I started to fully understand what was going on with my mind and my thoughts within it.

I got medication and therapy which I think is a healthy combination. I’m not the one to judge, because these things work differently for everyone, but this has been working the best for me personally. This is one side of the story, because this is the more technical side of it. Working on yourself through therapy. It’s like a more theoretical side, but how did I fare in real life? Whilst I’ve been very positive with therapy and complying with what the therapists want me to do, I was rather self-destructive in life.

Talking about how you feel is not constrained to professional help, but it can be anyone. Your friends, family, co-workers, teachers, students. Anyone. But I failed to register and think about, was the fact that those aforementioned people, have not been trained in the field of mental health help. Or not everyone is willing to believe that mental health problems/illnesses are a thing. Or don’t want to talk about it. Or can’t comprehend your mental suffering. Which is why I felt left out. Because I was so ignorant enough to think that everyone could talk about it, but they were abandoning me. So I did two things. I started to alienate me from the person who love me and I started this blog (which also includes me talking about the same topics on social media). The social media and the alienation from my loved ones, that was the start of the darkest aftermath of my already darker period in life. The time that I was caught in a very toxic environment and I didn’t find out after a year or so.

Social media can be a very tough place. I’m not saying that you should dismiss social media, not at all. But in talking about mental health online, I started to hangout with people who spoke about mental health too. But not everyone did in the same capacity, and with the knowledge I do have now, I would say it was rather negative and toxic. It made me a bit worse. The thing that was negative and toxic, was the fact that I would focus on having this exclusive group with people who would suffer and we were (including myself) quite hostile towards non-sufferers. I don’t consider those people to be bad people, but it was rather toxic. In doing this I created a bigger divide between myself and my friends & family, which I do regret greatly. In that toxicness, I believed that I wasn’t worth anything, and I wasn’t worth of receiving and deserving positive feelings. In the end it was football that made me focus on something else and made me aware of the world that is out there. To be honest, I was very disconnected with reality. And I’m glad that has changed for the better right now. My balance with social media and talking about mental health has been so much better. I still talk to amazing peope online and I’m happy I’ve connected  with great people. But I know my self-worth better now.

This has been a little history of my dealings with mental health in the past, but how do I live with it right now? As we speak I’m going through a bout of depression and I’m feeling rather sad. It’s not ideal, but I’m grateful that I can do the things that I want to do. It’s important that you have respect for yourself and take care of yourself.

Mental health in football academies

Mental health in football academies is such a weird topic. On one hand we can sense that the world is getting more understanding of mental health issues, but one the other hand – this doesn’t seem to be the case for football academies. There has been more understanding for players at the very top who have already made their full debuts and are established in the game, but for youth players this is incredibly hard.

The young players are not only concerned with playing well and getting results as a team, but they are in a rather special position as they need to prove themselves worthy of being in the academy AND showing that they might be a good signing for the senior side of the club. That is a huge pressure they need to deal with. And yes of course, that is what elite sport is all about, but I think it’s really important to focus more on the mental aspect of a player.

First of all, we are all humans and we should also be looked after as such. That might be a task for academies to look into, because after all, mentally strong players and players to be able to deal with their emotions, can provide great insights. Being strong doesn’t mean that you don’t suffer from a mental health problem, but it’s the way you treat and act on it, is what makes you strong.

I’m not sure where I want to go with this piece, but it’s a reminder of that mental health is vital in a player’s development as a player, but also as a human. You never know what’s really going on in the head of players and if you tend to their mental health, you might make sure the players feel more comfortable and as results, might become better players.

If you are someone who’s strugging, I always try to remind myself of the following words:

It’s okay to not be okay, but it’s equally okay to  be okay. Feeling sad, angry or giving in into your mental health issue, problem or illness, is not the end of the world. Far from it. It’s not about winning or losing these battles, because in the end there’s only one thing that matters: winning the war. Shine on you beautiful diamond.

Case study: 4-2-3-1 formation analysis

My fourth and last case study in Dutch academy football concentrates on formations. More specifically, I’ve looked at two formations used in the U18’s of several clubs. This analysis focuses on the theory of what’s good and what’s not so good about the 4-3-3 formations and the 4-2-3-1 formations. In part II: 4-2-3-1

These two formations have been used the most by the teams in the U18 leagues I’ve observed and in this analysis I will focus on a few things:

  • The defensive role of the midfield: double or single pivot
  • The attacking role of the midfield: the number ’10’
  • Pressing from the front

Often formation is used by media and fans as something that is static, as if each players holds a specific position – but as you may have seen or know, they are rather fluid and change within the game. But the roles asigned to players in a system, that’s what’s important in a game.

In this analysis I will focus on what I’ve observed in the games I’ve seen in the U18 league. This might be different to what senior sides do and the decisions made in attack, defence and transition can therefore be different than what is best, but this analysis looks at what happened.

The 4-2-3-1

A 4-3-3 is the formation of the Dutch footballing DNA. Many academies have been drenched with the idea of a 4-3-3, but the 4-2-3-1 is being played more often nowadays. This has to do with the idea that the playing philosophy of the first team should reflect the academy and vice versa.

There is a back four and a low defensive bloc – which also can be described as the double pivot in midfield. These six player form the defensive side of the starting 11. The attacking midfield consists of three players with #11 and #7 having space in front of them and the #10 staying a bit deeper. In this system there is one striker, as you can see with the #9.

Looking back at the games I’ve seen, the double pivot has not only a role to play in defence, but also in attack. How? The double pivot consisted of two defensive midfielders or a central + defensive midfield combination (the central midfielder would have more defensive qualities than attacking). This double pivot makes it so that there are essentially six defensive players in the team and this enables the four attacking players to think more in attack.

These four players are not only tasked with attacking, but they are encouraged and allowed to express more creative freedom. When they lose the ball, there is a defensive bloc that will try to deal with it in transition, before the back four will be threatened by the opponent’s attack.

There a few things different in the games I’ve observed from the 4-3-3. In the image above you can see how the attacks are constructed in a way. The ball was often played from the central defensive duo to the defensive bloc/double pivot. They would have several options going forward, but they often picked out the wide attacking midfielders. The difference is that they are not real wingers in the sense of the 4-3-3, but are more inverted and this is the key.

The #11 and #7 receive the ball and move inside into the box, where they would try to create a chance for the striker via a through ball or, would shoot with from that position. But that’s not the only attacking role they play. In the case that the defensive bloc picks out a pass to the upcoming full backs – who have a slightly more attacking role in this approach – the full backs move into the wide area. The wide midfielders and the #10 all move closer to the box, resulting in the following situation:

  • #9, #7 and #11 in the box
  • #10 in zone 14

The full backs had two options going forward which would create a lot of threat. Option one was to swing the ball into the box via a cross, with three players trying to attack that cross in the air. Option two was that the full back would go closer to the back line and try to pick out the #10, who was moving forward from zone 14.

The 4-2-3-1 was very effective when the team went into transition from defence to attack and wanted to create a goalscoring opportunity quickly. They could take risks and be more direct, because of their ‘safety-net’ of the double pivot.

Like I said above, hwne the ball was lost – the first line of dence was the double pivot, but that didn’t mean that the midfield was lost. The formation shifted and although the double pivot had to deal with the threat of the opponent, the formation would then change into a 4-5-1 formation in most cases in order to create a numeric advantage in midfield.

You can see this in the image above. When for example #10 lost a all, #6 and #8 were tasked of stopping the opponent. At the same time the attacking midfielders would drop deeper and join the double pivot to create a five-man midfield.

The 4-5-1 doesn’t really differ too much from the 4-2-3-1 as a midfield, but the defensive bloc and the attacking midfielders are playing more compactly, which makes them stronger as a defensive unit. At the same time it’s easier when they are transitioning from defence to attack, to get back in the shape of the 4-2-3-1.

It’s a slightly different approach than with a 4-3-3 with more attacking threat created to central zones of the pitch rather than from the flanks. The involvement of full backs from the flanks creates a different dynamic though, but the idea of having a defensive and attacking bloc, sits very well with some of the teams observed in the Dutch U18’s leagues.

*The tactical images are made with Tactical Pad, which gave me the freedom to alter the pitch just like I wanted to.

Case study: 4-3-3 formation analysis

My fourth and last case study in Dutch academy football concentrates on formations. More specifically, I’ve looked at two formations used in the U18’s of several clubs. This analysis focuses on the theory of what’s good and what’s not so good about the 4-3-3 formations and the 4-2-3-1 formations. In part I: 4-3-3

These two formations have been used the most by the teams in the U18 leagues I’ve observed and in this analysis I will focus on a few things:

  • The defensive role of the midfield: double or single pivot
  • The attacking role of the midfield: the number ’10’
  • Pressing from the front

Often formation is used by media and fans as something that is static, as if each players holds a specific position – but as you may have seen or know, they are rather fluid and change within the game. But the roles asigned to players in a system, that’s what’s important in a game.

In this analysis I will focus on what I’ve observed in the games I’ve seen in the U18 league. This might be different to what senior sides do and the decisions made in attack, defence and transition can therefore be different than what is best, but this analysis looks at what happened.

The 4-3-3

When one of the teams played a 4-3-3 in the U18 leagues, it was constructed as in the image above. A back four with one defensive midfielder (#6) and two midfielders higher up the pitch. Usually this was one central midfielder and one attacking midfielder. On top there was an attacking trio of one striker and two wingers, who usually made runs down the line and delivered crosses to the striker and the attacking midfielder moving up the pitch.

With the 4-3-3 formation you make use of the wings from your wing-attackers as you can see in the image below. The wingers move into the white positions on the wing and are tasked initially with providing crosses into the box, where the number 9 is moving towards.

But that is not their only task. They are trained and have been instructed to look for the attacking midfielder(s) entering the zone just behind the box, also know as zone 14. This is a position from where a lot of goalscoring threat is created via through passes or shots.

In this case the number 10 is very active and committed to be involved in the attacking play of the side with the possession of the ball and the number 7 is a bit more conservative in the case possession is lost and the transition from attack to defence happens.

Now attacking via the flanks can be a great threat to the opponent’s goal, but can give disadvantages as well. When the wingers are very well defended, it can leave the striker to be isolated and he has no support. The number 10 in this case won’t make the run forward, but makes himself available to receive a pass.

The wingers also need to be very aware of their defensive positioning: blocking pass lanes and trailing back. If they don’t do that, the opponent’s full backs have a lot of space to progress into the middle third of the pitch.

Illustrated in the image above is how the attacking midfield acted in a scenario when the ball was with the team analysed. In this 4-3-3 there was one defensive midfielder or a single pivot, who was tasked with the defensive duties and acted as the defensive unit with the four-man defence.

The 4-3-3 does well with the ball because of their presence in the central zones of the pitch and can translate that into dominance. But also in in defence, this formation provides an advantage with 3 midfielders, they defend the central zones of the pitch well and its difficult for the opponents to progress in the middle. And, when the opponent wants to progress via the flanks, they can usually only use one flank – as the other one can be pinned by one of the midfielders.

Talking about defence, a 4-3-3 in defence usually switched to a 4-4-2 in these games observed. This also can be seen in the image above. This makes the defensive block stronger, but in transition from attack to defence there is a big risk: when they play with one defensive midfielder, that player has to be disciplined in his positioning – when he is pulled away from his position, it opens space in the middle and that can lead to dangerous situations in the defensive third.

The 4-3-3 changes into a 4-4-2 in defence and what I’ve seen is that the two strikers in this formation (one striker and one winger) press the defence together. The four-man midfield rarely presses before the middle third and when they do, they do it as a unit.

It was a very interesting to see how a 4-3-3 moved and changed within different phases of the game. The U18’s are very close to what senior sides decide on the pitch, but the order of things is not always correct.

*The tactical images are made with Tactical Pad, which gave me the freedom to alter the pitch just like I wanted to.