Categorie: Tactical theory

Calculating triangular third-man runs with event data: how reliable are the results?

Posted on by admin

Data metrics and development always feel or look innovative. About 40% of the time, they are. It is very satisfying to create something that completely suits your needs, but one question always remains: how necessary is it to do so? My reason for it is that some metrics already exist, and it isnā€™t always necessary for your analysis to create everything yourself. Itā€™s very time-consuming, and thatā€™s not something we analysts often have.

To me, there is one clear exception: you donā€™t have the right resources. Often, we can look at event data and create our metrics, indexes and models from there. However, sometimes we want to look at off-ball data and we need tracking data to generate positional data and off-ball runs, for example. Iā€™m quite fortunate to work with clubs that have access to that data, but what if you donā€™t have that? You want to use the event data to be creative and give an indication of what is close to tracking data.

This might sound familiar to you, reading this or the concept from it. We do love pressing data, but not all providers have that, so we have a metric that measures pressing intensity: Passes Per Defensive Action (PPDA). It calculates the number of passes allowed by a teamā€™s opponent before the pressing team makes a defensive action (like a tackle, interception, or foul) in the opponentā€™s defensive two-thirds of the pitch. A low PPDA means aggressive pressing, and a lower PPDA means a more passive pressing approach.

In this article, I want to calculate a way to get third-man runs data with event data. After that, I want to evaluate how sound this method is and how reliable the results are.

Contents

  1. Why this research?
  2. Data collection
  3. Methodology
  4. Calculation
  5. Analysis
  6. Checks and evaluation

Why this research

This research is twofold, actually. My main aim is to see if I can find a creative way to capture third man runs with event data. I think it will give us some off-ball data via an out-of-the-box thinking pattern. Then we can use this in terms of off-ball scouting, analysis of players and teams, and of course, we can go even further and make models of that that predict a third-man run.

The second reason is that I feel that I can do better with evaluating the things I make. Check myself, check the validity of the models and the representation of the data. If I build this more into my public work, it will lead to a better understanding of the data engineering process, which is often frustrating and takes a long time to get right.

Data collection

The data collection is almost the same as in all other projects. The data Iā€™m using is even data from Opta/Statsperform, which means it contains the XY-values of every on-ball data as collected by this specific provider.

The data has been collected on Saturday, 12th of April 2025. The data concentrates on one league specifically, and that is the Argentinian League 2025, as Iā€™m branching out to South American football content only on this platform.

What I also will aim to do is to create a few new metrics, which will then be my own metrics. These are my designs based on Opta/Statsperform data and will be available on my GitHub page.

Methodology

Third man runs are one of footballā€™s most elegant attacking patterns ā€” subtle, intelligent, and often decisive. At their core, these movements involve three players: the first (Player A) plays a pass into a teammate (Player B), who quickly connects with a third player (Player C) arriving from a different area. Itā€™s C who truly benefits, receiving the ball in space created by the initial pass-and-move. This movement structure mirrors the concept of triadic closure from network theory, where three connected nodes form a triangle ā€” a configuration known to create stability and flow in complex systems. In football, this triangle is a strategic weapon: it preserves possession while simultaneously generating overloads and disorganizing defensive shapes.

To detect these patterns in event data, we treat each pass as a directed edge in a dynamic graph, with time providing the sequence. The detection algorithm follows a constrained path: Aā†’B followed by Bā†’C, where A, B, and C are distinct teammates. The off-ball movement from Aā€™s pass to Cā€™s reception is measured using Euclidean distance ā€” a direct application of spatial geometry to quantify run intensity. But thereā€™s more at play than just movement. From an information-theoretic perspective, third man runs are low-probability, high-reward decisions. Using Shannon entropy, we can frame each playerā€™s passing options as a probability distribution: the higher the entropy, the more unpredictable and creative the decision. Third man runs often emerge in moments of lower entropy, where players bypass obvious choices in favor of coordinated, rehearsed sequences.

Over time, these passing sequences can be modeled as a Markov chain, where each playerā€™s action (state) depends only on the previous action in the chain. While simple possession patterns often result in high state recurrence (e.g., passing back and forth), third man runs introduce state transitions that break the chainā€™s memoryless monotony. This injects volatility and forward momentum into the system ā€” qualities typically associated with higher goal probability. By combining network topology, geometric analysis, and probabilistic modeling, we build not just a detector but a lens into one of footballā€™s most intelligent tactical tools. And with a value-scoring mechanism grounded in normalization and vector calculus, we begin to quantify what coaches have always known: the most dangerous player is often the one who never touched the ball until the moment it mattered.

Calculations

Letā€™s walk through how we identify and evaluate a third-man run using real match data. Imagine Player A, a midfielder, passes the ball from position (37.5, 20.2) on the pitch. Player B receives it and quickly lays it off to Player C, who arrives in space and receives the ball at (71.8, 40.3). By checking the event timestamps, we know this sequence happened over 35 seconds ā€” enough time for Player C to make a significant off-ball movement. The key here is that Player A never passed directly to Player C; the move relies on coordination and timing, a perfect example of a third man run.

We start by calculating the Euclidean distance between Aā€™s pass location and Cā€™s reception point, which comes out to about 39.75 meters. Dividing that by the time difference gives us a run speed of 1.14 meters per second. We also look at how much progress the ball made toward the goal, called the vertical gain, which in this case is around 0.33 (when normalized to a standard 105-meter pitch). Each of these factors ā€” distance, vertical gain, and speed ā€” is normalized and plugged into a weighted scoring formula. For this example, the resulting value score is 0.468, indicating a moderately valuable third man run.

This process helps quantify the kind of off-ball intelligence that often goes unnoticed. Instead of just knowing who passed to whom, we begin to understand how space is created and exploited. With just a few lines of code and some well-defined logic, we turn tactical nuance into measurable insight ā€” bridging the gap between data and the gameā€™s deeper layers.

Analysis

By running the Python code, I get the results of the third-man runs and every player involved. I also calculated a score that gives value to the third man run as to how useful it is. The Excel file that came out of it looks like this:

First, let us have a look at the teams with the most third-man runs during these games we have collected:

As we can conclude from the bar graph above, Argentinos Juniors, Estudiantes and Boca Juniors have the most third-man runs. Having said that, Newellā€™s Old Boys, Belgrano and Deportivo Riestra have the fewest third man runs.

Of course, these are just volume numbers. Letā€™s compare them to the average value:

What we see is quite interesting. The majority of the teams have an average value between 0,3 and 0,5 per third-man runs. The more they participate in third man runs, the more the value is even. As you can see, the teams with the fewest have more positive and negative anomalies.

Finally, I want to find the players who are player C, as they are the ones doing the third-man run. I also want to see their value score on average, so we can see how dangerous their runs are.

As we can see, there is a similar pattern with how the value is assigned. More third man runs also means a more similar value to their peers. This is very interesting.

We can see the best players in terms of the value they give with their runs. I have selected only players with at least 5 runs to make it more representative. Itā€™s also important to stress that the league hasnā€™t been concluded and the data will be different when the season is over.

Now this is a way how we create the metric and analyse it, but how valid is this data actually?

Checks and evaluation

Now Iā€™m going to check whether this is all worth the calculation or that I need to make drastic changes

First, I will look at the feature. The composite score is based on the following: distance (50%), Vertical gain toward the goal (30%) and speed (20%). This seems like a reasonable way to use weights, but I could increase the vertical gain for the values.

Second, looking at the output, I need to ask myself the following questions:

  • Are top-scoring actions meaningful? (e.g. fast break runs, line-breaking passes)
  • Are short, back-passes scoring low?
  • Are there any nonsensical values like 0 distance or negative speed?

Following that, looking at the distribution validation:

The distribution of normalized value scores for third-man runs appears healthy overall, showing a positive skew with most scores clustered between 0.2 and 0.5. This shape aligns with expectations in football, where high-value tactical patterns ā€” like truly effective third-man runs ā€” should be relatively rare. The presence of a single peak at 1.0 suggests a standout moment, potentially representing a high-speed, long-distance run that created significant forward momentum. Importantly, the model avoids overinflating value, as thereā€™s no unnatural cluster near the top end of the scale, which supports its reliability in distinguishing impactful actions from routine ones.

However, the tight cluster around the 0.2ā€“0.3 range may point to a limited scoring spread, potentially reducing how well the metric separates moderately good actions from low-value ones. This could be a result of either low variability in the input features (like speed or vertical gain) or an overemphasis on distance within the weighted formula. If the score distribution stays compressed, it may make ranking or comparative use of the metric less insightful. Adjusting the weighting or introducing non-linear scaling to amplify score separation could help refine the index for better tactical and scouting utility.

If you liked reading this, you can always follow me on X and BlueSky.

Chess strategies in football: designing tactical passing styles based on chess āš½ļøā™Ÿļø

Posted on by admin

Football tactics is what originally swayed me in the direction of football analysis.Ā Iā€™mĀ a sucker for patterns and causal relationship, sos when I was introduced to football tactics, I was completely emerged and sucked into the world of tactical analysis.

A few years later, I ran into a quite common problem: data vs. eyes. I have mostly focused on data lately, and thatā€™s what I work with. In other words, right now, I work as a data engineer at a professional football club, where I donā€™t really focus on any aspect of video. The problem arises that for tactics, we mostly use our eyes because the data canā€™t tell us why something happens at a specific time on the pitch.

This got me thinking. Which sport has decision-making and tactical approaches, yet can be analysed with data? My eyes ā€” pun intended ā€” turned towards chess and the openings/defences you got there. In this article, I aim to translate, convert and surpass chess strategies and make them actionable for analysis.

This article will describe a few chess strategies and how we can look into them with data and create playing styles/tactics from them.Ā The methodology will be a vital part of this analysis.

Contents

  1. Introduction: Why compare chess and football?
  2. Data representation and resources
  3. Chess strategies
  4. Defining the framework: converting chess into football tactics
  5. Methodology
  6. Analysis
  7. Challenges and difficulties
  8. Final thoughts

Introduction: Why compare chess and football?

First of all, I love comparisons with other disciplines. It gives us an idea of where we can improve from other sports and/or influence other sports. Until now, I have focused mostly on basketball and ice hockey, but there are other sports I want to have a look at: rugby, American football and baseball.

Truth be told, do I know a lot about chess? Probably not. Iā€™m a fairly decent chess player, and I know the basic theory of strategies in chess, but you wonā€™t find an ELO rating to be proud of you in my house. But thatā€™s beside the point. The point is that I love chess for its tactics and strategies. Itā€™s so prevalent in our language that we often call close-knit games:Ā a game of chess.

My brain wanted to make a comparison between chess tactics and chess moves that can be seen in the light of certain actions and patterns in football. For that specific little research and to get the tactics, I am going to look at chess moves and relate them to passing in football. This will become slightly clearer in the rest of the article.

Data representation and sources

This remains a blog or website where I love to showcase data and what you can do with it. This article is no different.

The data Iā€™m using for this is data gained from Opta/StatsPerform and focuses on the event data of the English Premier League 2024ā€“2025. The data was collected on March 1st 2025.

We focus on all players and teams in the league, but for our chain events and scores, we focus on players that have played over 450 minutes or 5 games in the regular season. In that way we can make the data and, subsequently the results, more representative to work with.

Chess strategies

There are 11 strategies that I have found in chess that I found were suitable for analysis. Our analysis focuses on passing styles based on the chess strategies.

Caro-Kann Defense (Counterattacking, Defensive)

  • Moves: 1. e4 c6 2. d4 d5
  • A solid and resilient defense against 1. e4. Black delays piece development in favor of a strong pawn structure. Often leads to closed, positional battles where Black seeks long-term counterplay.

Scotch Game (Attacking)

  • Moves: 1. e4 e5 2. Nf3 Nc6 3. d4. White aggressively challenges the center early. Leads to open positions with fast piece development and tactical opportunities. White often aims for a kingside attack or central dominance.

Nimzo-Indian Defense (Counterattacking, Positional)

  • Moves: 1. d4 Nf6 2. c4 e6 3. Nc3 Bb4. Black immediately pins Whiteā€™s knight on c3, controlling the center indirectly. Focuses on long-term strategic play rather than immediate counterattacks. Offers deep positional ideas, such as doubled pawns and bishop pair imbalances.

Sicilian Defense (Counterattacking, Attacking)

  • Moves: 1. e4 c5 Black avoids symmetrical pawn structures, leading to sharp, double-edged play. Common aggressive variations: Najdorf, Dragon, Sveshnikov, Scheveningen. White often plays Open Sicilian (2. Nf3 followed by d4) to create attacking chances.

Kingā€™s Indian Defense (Counterattacking)

  • Moves: 1. d4 Nf6 2. c4 g6 3. Nc3 Bg7. Black allows White to occupy the center with pawns, then strikes back with ā€¦e5 or ā€¦c5. Leads to sharp middle games where Black attacks on the kingside and White on the queenside.

Ruy-Lopez (Attacking, Positional)

  • Moves: 1. e4 e5 2. Nf3 Nc6 3. Bb5. White applies early pressure on Blackā€™s knight, planning long-term positional gains. Leads to rich, strategic play with both attacking and defensive options. Popular variations: Closed Ruy-Lopez, Open Ruy-Lopez, Berlin Defense.

Queenā€™s Gambit (Attacking, Positional)

  • Moves: 1. d4 d5 2. c4. White offers a pawn to gain strong central control and initiative. If Black accepts (Queenā€™s Gambit Accepted), White gains rapid development. If Black declines (Queenā€™s Gambit Declined), a long-term strategic battle ensues.

French Defense (Defensive, Counterattacking)

  • Moves: 1. e4 e6. Black invites White to control the center but plans to challenge it with ā€¦d5. Often leads to closed, slow-paced games where maneuvering is key. White may attack on the kingside, while Black plays for counterplay in the center or queenside.

Alekhine Defense (Counterattacking)

  • Moves: 1. e4 Nf6. Black provokes White into overextending in the center, planning a counterattack. Leads to unbalanced positions with both positional and tactical play. It can transpose into hypermodern setups, where Black undermines Whiteā€™s center.

GrĆ¼nfeld Defense (Counterattacking, Positional)

  • Moves: 1. d4 Nf6 2. c4 g6 3. Nc3 d5. Black allows White to build a strong center, then attacks it with pieces rather than pawns. Leads to open, sharp positions where Black seeks dynamic counterplay.

Pirc Defense (Defensive, Counterattacking)

  • Moves: 1. e4 d6 2. d4 Nf6 3. Nc3 g6. Black fianchettos the dark-square bishop, delaying direct confrontation in the center. Leads to flexible, maneuvering play, often followed by a counterattack. White can opt for aggressive setups like the Austrian Attack.

Defining the framework: converting chess into football tactics

A Caro-Kann Defense in chess is built on strong defensive structure and gradual counterplay, mirroring a possession-oriented style in football, where teams maintain the ball, carefully build their attacks, and avoid risky passes. On the other hand, the Scotch Game, an aggressive opening that prioritises rapid piece development and early control, aligns with high-tempo vertical passing. Teams using this style move the ball forward quickly, looking to exploit spaces between the lines and catch opponents off guard.

Some openings in chess focus on inviting pressure to counterattack, a principle widely used in football. The Sicilian Defense allows White to attack first, only for Black to strike back with powerful counterplay. This is akin to teams that play deep and absorb pressure before launching devastating transitions. Similarly, the Kingā€™s Indian Defense concedes space early before unleashing an aggressive kingside attack, where the team defended deep and then launched precise, rapid counterattacks.

Certain chess openings focus on compact positional play and indirect control, mirroring football teams that overload key areas of the pitch without necessarily dominating possession. The Nimzo-Indian Defense, for instance, does not immediately fight for central space but instead restricts the opponentā€™s development, where tight defensive structure and midfield control dictate the game. Likewise, the French Defense prioritizes a solid defensive structure and controlled build-up, where possession is carefully circulated before breaking forward.

Teams that thrive on wide play and overlapping full-backs resemble chess openings that emphasize control of the boardā€™s edges. The GrĆ¼nfeld Defense, which allows an opponent to take central space before striking from the flanks. In contrast, teams that bait opponents into pressing only to bypass them with quick passes follow the logic of the Alekhine Defense, which provokes aggressive moves from White and counters efficiently.

The flexibility of the Pirc Defense, an opening that adapts to an opponentā€™s approach before deciding on a course of action, can be likened to teams that switch between possession play and direct football depending on the game situation. The adaptability of this approach makes it unpredictable and difficult to counter.

Methodology

So now we have the strategies from chess that we are going to use for the analysis, and we know how they resemble similar football tactics already. The next step is to look at existing data and see how we can derive the appropriate metrics to design something new in football.

From the event data we need a few things to start the calculation:

  • Timestamps
  • x, y
  • playerId and playerName
  • team
  • typeId
  • outcome
  • KeyPass
  • endX, endY
  • passlength

First, individual match data is processed to extract essential passing attributes such as pass coordinates, pass lengths, and event types. For each pass, metrics like forward progression, lateral movement, and entries into the final third are computed, forming the building blocks of the tactical analysis.

Once these basic measures are derived, seven distinct metrics are calculated from the passing events: progressive passes, risk-taking passes, lateral switches, final third entries, passes made under pressure, high-value key passes, and crosses into the box. Each metric captures a specific aspect of passing behavior, reflecting how aggressively or defensively a team approaches building an attack.

For every tactical archetype ā€” each modeled after a corresponding chess opening ā€” a unique set of weights is assigned to these metrics. The overall strategy score for a team in a given match is then computed by multiplying each metric by its respective weight and summing the results. This weighted sum provides a single numerical value that encapsulates the teamā€™s tendency towards a particular passing style.

Strategy Score=w1ā€‹(progressive)+w2ā€‹(risk-taking)+w3ā€‹(lateral switch)+w4ā€‹(final third)+w5ā€‹(under pressure)+w6ā€‹(high-value key)+w7ā€‹(crosses)

You can find the Python code here.

Analysis

Now, with that data we can do a lot of things. We can for example look at percentile ranks and see what the intent is of a team regarding a specific style:

We can see how well Liverpool performs in the strategies coming from chess, and that leads to a shot. This shows us that the French Defence and the Caro-Kann are two strategies wherein Liverpool scores the best in, in relation to the rest of the league.

The next thing we can do is to see how well Liverpool in this case does when we compare two different metrics/strategies.

In this scatterplot we look at two different strategies. The aim is to look at how well Liverpool scores in both metrics, but also to look at the correlation between the two metrics.

Liverpool perform in the high average for metrics, while Nottingham Forest and Manchester City are outliers for these two strategies ā€” meaning that they create many shot above average from these two strategies.

Anothre way of visualising how well teams are creating shots from certain tactical styles adopted from chess, is a beeswarm plot.

In the visual above you can see the z-scores per strategy and where Liverpool is placed in the quantity of getting shots. As you can see they score around the mean or slight above/under the mean with small standard deviations. Whatā€™s important here is they donā€™t seem to be outliers in both the positive or negative way.

Challenges

  • Chess moves are clearly categorised, but football actions depend on multiple moving elements and real-time decisions.
  • Assigning numerical values to football tactics is complex because the same play can have different outcomes.
  • In football, opponents react dynamically, unlike in chess where the opponentā€™s possible responses are limited.
  • A single football tactic can have multiple different outcomes based on execution and opponent adaptation.
  • There is no single equivalent to chess move evaluation in football, as every play depends on multiple contextual factors.

Final thoughts

Chess and football might seem worlds apart ā€” one is rigid and turn-based, the other a chaotic dance of movement and reaction. Chess moves have clear evaluations, while football tactics shift with every pass, press, and positioning change. Concepts like forks and gambits exist in spirit but lack the structured predictability that chess offers. And while chess follows a finite game tree, football is a web of endless possibilities, shaped by human intuition and external forces.

Bridging this gap means bringing structure to footballā€™s fluidity. Value-based models like Expected Possession Value (EPV), VAEP, and Expected Threat (xT) can quantify decisions much like a chess engine evaluates moves. Reinforcement learning and tactical decision trees add another layer, helping teams optimize play in real-time. Football will never be as predictable as chess, but with the right models, it can become more strategic, measurable, and refined ā€” a game of decisions, not just moments.

PPDA SHOULDNā€™T BE USED TO MEASURE THE PRESSING INTENSITY

Posted on by admin

Okay, maybe that title is too strong. Iā€™m not sure. But I know that using a single data metric to value an off-ball action is incredibly vague and complex. Especially when we look at data, itā€™s so difficult to quantify pressing activities. So, in this article, I will tell you why I think PPDA isnā€™t the right metric AND should never be used alone to measure pressing intensity.

Pressing

Pressing is an important tactical aspect of football that involves one team actively trying to win the ball back from the other team. Pressing can take many different forms, from a high press in which the team presses aggressively and high up the field, to a low block in which the team sits deep and focuses on defending their own goal.

One of the main benefits of pressing is that it can disrupt the oppositionā€™s attacking play and prevent them from building up momentum. By winning the ball back quickly and high up the field, a team can catch the opposition off guard and potentially create scoring opportunities for themselves. Pressing can also be effective at tiring out the opposition, as it requires a lot of physical and mental effort to constantly try and play through a press.

Pressing can also be an effective way to defend against teams that are strong in possession. By forcing the opposition to play quickly and under pressure, a team can reduce the time and space that the opposition has on the ball, making it more difficult for them to create scoring chances.

However, pressing is not without its risks. If a team presses too aggressively and leaves gaps in their defense, they may be vulnerable to counter-attacks. Additionally, if a team is not well-organized or does not have the physical fitness to maintain a press for an extended period of time, they may struggle to win the ball back and may be more susceptible to conceding goals.

Overall, pressing can be a valuable tactical tool in football, but it is important for teams to carefully consider the context of the game and the strengths and weaknesses of their opponents before deciding whether or not to press.

Data context

Context is important when working with data because it helps to provide meaning and interpretation to the data. Without context, data can be difficult to understand and may not provide a clear picture of what is happening.

Context is also important when comparing data from different sources or time periods. Without context, it may be difficult to accurately compare data because we donā€™t know if the data was collected in the same way or if it is relevant to the same issues.

In summary, context is important when working with data because it helps to provide meaning and interpretation to the data and allows us to accurately compare and analyse it. Without context, data can be difficult to understand and may not provide a clear picture of what is happening.

PPDA

PPDA (passes per defensive action) is a metric that is used to measure how aggressively a team presses or defends. It is calculated by dividing the number of passes that a team allows by the number of defensive actions (tackles, interceptions, etc.) that they make.

While PPDA can be a useful metric for measuring pressing, it is not sufficient on its own for several reasons:

  1. It only measures the number of passes allowed, not the quality of those passes. A team could allow a high number of passes but still, be effective at pressing if they are able to force their opponents into making low-quality passes. The quality of the passes allowed is important because it can impact the success of the press. For example, if a team allows a high number of passes but those passes are all long balls that are easily cleared by the defense, then the press may still be effective even though a high number of passes were allowed. On the other hand, if a team allows a low number of passes but those passes are all short, accurate passes that allow the opposition to easily bypass the press, then the press may be less effective.
  2. It does not take into account other factors that can impact pressing, such as the positioning of players, the speed of the press, and the overall tactics of the team. The positioning of players is important because it can affect the effectiveness of the press. For example, if a team has their defenders positioned too high up the field, they may leave gaps in their defense that the opposition can exploit. Similarly, if a teamā€™s midfielders are positioned too far apart, they may struggle to effectively press the opposition and may be unable to win the ball back. The speed of the press can also be important. If a team presses too slowly, they may allow the opposition time to bypass the press and launch an attack. On the other hand, if a team presses too quickly, they may leave themselves vulnerable to counter-attacks if they are unable to win the ball back. The overall tactics of the team can also impact the effectiveness of the press. For example, if a team is using a high press, they may be more effective at winning the ball back in the opponentā€™s half of the field. However, if they are using a low block, they may be more focused on defending their own goal and may be less effective at pressing.
  3. It does not account for the oppositionā€™s attacking quality. A team may allow a low number of passes but still be ineffective at pressing if they are facing a strong attacking team that is able to break through their press. The attacking quality of the opposition can impact the effectiveness of the press because it determines how difficult it is for the pressing team to win the ball back. If a team is facing a strong attacking team with skilled dribblers, creative passers, and clinical finishers, they may struggle to effectively press and may be more likely to allow passes. On the other hand, if a team is facing a weaker attacking team, they may be more successful at pressing and may be able to win the ball back more often.
  4. It does not take into account the context of the game. The score, the time remaining, and the overall strategy of the team can all impact how aggressively they press. For example, if a team is trailing late in the game, they may press more aggressively in an attempt to try and equalize. On the other hand, if a team is leading and is looking to close out the game, they may be more conservative and focus on defending rather than pressing. The overall strategy of the team can also impact their pressing tactics.

Final thoughts

PPDA is a data metric which can assist in measuring pressing in a game, but in isolation it doesnā€™t mean a lot. This is strengthened by the notion that off ball actions arenā€™t properly caught in data collection yet.

CASE STUDY JUGENDLIGA U18: POSITION-ORIENTED ZONAL MARKING WITH A DEEP 4-4-2

Posted on by admin

Talking to some friend the other day and I was asked what I liked the most about football ā€“ the actual moment I could enjoy of a team. Many assume that Iā€™m a very offensive-minded coach and analyst, but thatā€™s not something I get the most satisfaction from.

In this article I will focus on something that a find very interesting: position-oriented marking in a 4-4-2. The reason why Iā€™m writing this is because of the perception that defending with an unit is a very tough thing to do. In this analysis I will attempt the explain the basics using visualisations and explain the roles of the players in this specific 4-4-2.

The compact 4-4-2

In the image above you see the formation of two teams. The blue team lines up in a 4-4-2 formation and the orange formation lines up in a 4-2-3-1 team. In this analysis I will focus on the blue team. First thing that you might notice is that the whole defensive line and midfield line are flat ā€“ this is something that is trained and coached, because itā€™s important for these lines to act as unit, hence the two lines of four. 

The second thing is that the two strikers play in the same line or in the central zones, as the two central midfielders and the two central midfielder. This is done to always keep the balance horizontally and vertically ā€“ making sure that you are not overloaded in these area.

Obviously, these are starting positions for the teams, but a vital part of the 4-4-2 is that without the ball, the 4-4-2 remains deep and will act as a compact unit of two lines of four plus their strikers ā€“ which will make the type of zonal marking easier.

Position-oriented zonal marking
Before I embark on the specifics of this type of zonal marking in my case study, I will have a look at what position-oriented zonal marking is. According to the wonderful people at Spielverlagerung it is as follows: ā€œIn position-oriented zonal marking, the playerā€™s reference point is his ā€œteammatesā€. The team simply operates in a closed block. This ā€˜blockā€™ is nothing but a formation, in which the respective positions are clearly defined and a player ā€œcoversā€ his own position. The term position marking could also be used.ā€

It means that if the a player of the opposition is able to receive a pass, the closest player will go their and mark that certain area. As a consquence ā€“ in reference to the teammates ā€“ the other playes will move in that particular direction to, because they are a unit. In the case of our team, it means two lines of four in that particular type of zonal marking.

Zonal marking with 4-4-2

In the image above you see the pitch lined up when the orange team has the ball. In this scenaro either one of the central defenders has the ball and they try to progress on the pitch. The full backs remain wide, as do the wide-midfielder/wingers ā€“ and these are important to keep looking at.

The blue team defends and their formation changes slightly in position. The four-man defence and four-man midfield remain, while the two strikers assume a higher position on the pitch, against the double pivot employed by the opposition. Whatā€™s important that the compactness of those two lines of four remains and that they remain to defend on a line. The full-backs and wide-midfielder seem to in an unnatural position, but in this case, were they to progress, it would ruin the compact defensive set-up with two defensive lines.

In the image above you see a situation wherein the attacking side moves forward. The sole strikers plays between the lines, but the attacking midfield trio are playing in the central zones and half spaces. The left wide-midfielder/winger leaves the half space for the wide space, and in doing so progresses down the line. In reaction to that the right wide midfielder of the blue team goes closer to him, as the winger is entering his zone.

There are two things that were quite interesting in observing this kind of zonal marking. First of all, not the whole team participates in this zonal marking. The two strikers have a different scheme of marking ā€“ which I wonā€™t go into here ā€“ and are not involved with position-oriented zonal marking. Their position isnā€™t compact either, so there is more space between them en the midfield-four. 

The second things thatā€™s interesting here is that when the right-wide midfielder goes to defend his zone and mark that zone, the whole defensive line will shift in the way itā€™s teammate does. So he goes up and right, which as a consequence sees seven other players do the same thing, therefore they move like a unit.

Function of the strikers

So as mention above, the two strikers do not interact with the zonal marking scheme. What I did find what was interesting, was how they were used in case of a transition. The zonal marking often proved to be successful and from that position, the blue team could get the ball and get it forward.

Now, the ball would be immediately played long towards either striker, but they were not the classical strikers you might expect in a 4-4-2. They both left their positions in the central zone and occupied the half-space zone. This allowed them to occupy positions to force the opposition to chose a defensive action, while the long ball was played from the compact defensive lines.

WHAT THE SUPER LEAGUE NEGLECTED: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND REGIONALISM

Posted on by admin

Something slightly different today. As many of you have done too, I have watched the news surrounding the Super League with great surprise. I was not surprised that the Super League was introduced, not at all, because it has been in the works for quite some time now ā€“ but I was surprised by the lack of sympathy and empathy towards the people that make the game how it is: the fans.

The fans make the game. There has been a lot written about the financial impact of these decisions to clubs and fans, but fans are not necessarily impacted by finances and getting results every single time. What fans want and what football is all about is identification. The feeling of identifying with a club, what it represents and how it connects with your direct environment. And that is what this article is all about.

In this article I will look at several aspects of cultural identity that are connected with football and assess that these aspects are vital when looking at any new platform or idea within football.

Cultural nationalism
Supporting a football team has a lot to do with regionalism and nationalism. The term nationalism perhaps has a different and negative connotation, because of the 19th century ideology which has sparked racism, antisemitism and extreme capitalism ā€“ but there are different kinds of nationalism. To make a distinction is important as in football we focus on a nationalism that is concentrated on culture. 

We speak of three different kinds of nationalism:

  • State nationalism
  • Ethnic nationalism
  • Cultural nationalism

State nationalism is based on the fact where you are born. That is the collective idea of identifying with nationalism on base of a law called jus soli ā€“ which can be translated as the Law of Soil. The opposite of that kind of nationalism is ethnic nationalism which is based on the ethnicity of the person in question. In this is based on a law called jus sanguinis ā€“ which can be translated as the Law of Blood. These two represent two typical sides of the debate in nationalism, but like said before Iā€™m looking at a type of nationalism that lies between the aforementioned nationalism types: cultural nationalism.

Cultural nationalism doesnā€™t deal with ethnicity or the place where you were born, but concentrates on the fact of shared values of culture, traditions and language/dialects. This is something we can translate to football in a few things when looking at a fanā€™s perspective: the crest/logo of a club, the colours of the kit, the songs that are sung in the stadiums/ground, the connection to a city or region, the political affiliation of the fans, the flags, the history and the connection to emotions: the highs of good times and the lows of bad times.

Regionalism vs Globalisation
In this article and in terms of the Super League, we donā€™t speak about nationalism in the traditional sense because of the fact that we are talking about clubs and not nations ā€“ so in that case the nationalist sentiment is transfered to a specific area or region.

The world is more connected than ever at this time. Internet has opened a lot of doors and every day you can speak to people from all over the world and follow the news in every country of the world. We see federations growing and more agents and organisations get involved in supranationalist policies. Now, Iā€™m not going to say whether this is good or bad, but we have seen that the idea of a more global organisation like the European Union can lead to nationalist sentiment. This idea is fueled by the idea that people will lose their values, traditions and as a result of that: their true identity. 

This is also true for football in Europe. We have seen clubs going into mergers or getting new owners, which leads to disappointment and anger with the fans. What happens is that people become alienated from a football club that once represented their values and traditions. So in that light, people tend to support their local club more with the idea that it represents who they are rather than the so-called superclubs who have more businesses than a club you can identify with come Saturday.

ā€œA local geographic space only becomes a meaningful locale which informs action when individuals in particular social networks invest that locale with significance. The ā€˜localeā€™ becomes the symbol of the social network; it is a shared understanding developed by a particular group about the nature of their social group which is employed by members of the group to maintain and regulate their relations with each other and to denote appropriate forms of conduct. The locale comes to embody the central understandings of the group and acts as a common cultural resource by which members of the group are called to order.ā€ ā€“ Anthony King (Football fandom and post-national identity in the New Europe)

In the quote above we can see that the cultural hub that is a football club is not something organic, but is given meaning by the participants of that local hub. The identity of many is formed by that particular club and they give meaning to society, which is why the role of that club is so important in times of ongoing European integration.

The more we see supra-nationalist bodies emerge in different aspects of life, the more people will stand against for the sake of their identity. They have the feeling they are losing their identity and without identity, who are we? That feeling of uncertainty or feeling of being overlooked/forgotten, is something that strikes the core of our being.

The ā€˜Otherā€™
If we take on the idea of the football club as representation of a shared identity, than we also speak of the ā€˜otherā€™. In this context it means the existence of rivalry with another region. This can only happen when your identity is resembling that of the football club and itā€™s in your identity to have a shared rivalry with another football club and region. With the assimilation and integration of bigger and more global concepts of football, that part of the identity can be lost as well.

Collective identity within football
So we have the idea of a collective identity, but why is this is so important? Itā€™s the sole of supporting a football club. Itā€™s what gives people meaning, a sort of security in this whole full of insecurities. If you take that away, people find themselves lost in a way. The ESL has tried to take superclubs away from that what makes football so great: the fans and their identity. In doing so they have taken the risk that clubs will not be able to play domestically, which would have great impact on peopleā€™s lives and careers.

That risk has sparked an energy and reaction from the fans as we have seen over the past day, and the ESL has failed to acknowledge that. During these days we have seen the imagined identity grow into a real football community wherein the collective identity has grown into strong sentiments.

CASE STUDY DANISH U19 LIGAEN: 4-4-2 WITH DOUBLE FALSE 9

Posted on by admin

One of the reasons I love to go deeper into academies and youth teams is the fact that you can really experience a football culture from them. A first team is all about results and getting player in and out, but an academy doesnā€™t necesarily have to perform in order to be successful within their role. Their first objective or goal ā€“ well in most cases ā€“ is to develop players who are good enough for the first team. They play with a certain vision and philosophy, and thatā€™s what I find very, very interesting.

Scandinavian football has been known for the young talent where bigger leagues can scout in for relatively small fees. But itā€™s so much more than that. They play a refreshing style of football and thatā€™s developed in the academies. In this case study I will look to the U19 teams of the U19 ligaen of the past three season, without actually mentioning which teams I observed. The focus of this article is not to look at the philosophy of one particular club, but the overall trend within academy football in Denmark.

In this article, I will indeed look to the U19 Ligaen, but I will zoom in more closely as Iā€™ve been doing research into the double false 9 in a 4-4-2 system. The focus will be on the shape of the 4-4-2 vs a 4-3-3 combined with the roles of the double false 9.

What is a false nine?
A false 9 can be described as central forward who plays deeper than a conventional central forward and plays between the lines. The drop deep to find space between the lines and to invite/include wide players and advanced midfielders into the attack for several reasons. Mostly to give more options going forward and to hope to overload in the final third, if done with pace.

This means that the profile of a false 9 is not the same as from a typical central forward. This asks for a more dynamic player who can play as an attacking midfielder as well, who has excellent passing abilities and can see the game correctly going forward. Their eye shouldnā€™t instantly go towards the goal, but have composure and eye for their advancing teammates as well.

How does the double false 9 look like?

As we can see in the image above Iā€™ve set up a 4-4-2 against a 4-3-3 as seen often in these games. We see a stretched four-man midfield with the wide midfielders playing in the wide areas and the central midfielders playing between the central zones and the half-spaces. In the 4-4-2 system we obviously see two strikers, but these two strikers play in the half-space instead of the central zones.

What makes them a false 9 is the fact that they play deeper. They play between the defender and midfielders, which makes them play between the lines. This is contrary to conventional strikers who are pinned against the back-four of this 4-3-3 team.

Something thatā€™s also interesting in the way they line up is the fact that they play relatively close to the midfielders. If they were positioned any deeper it would like a six-man midfield playing as an attacking unit. Furthermore, there is a lot of space middle third for the opponent to go into the half-space when they transition from defence to attack, this is where this system is vulnerable.

The role of the double false 9

Iā€™m looking at an attacking sequence Iā€™ve seen used in 10+ games and thought was very interesting. The positioning of the two deep 9ā€™s changes when the blue team progresses to the middle third and makes movement to go into the attacking third. The strikers move from the half-space into the wide zones, creating space in both the half-spaces as the central zones. By doing so they asume the role of wingers and occupy the wings as such.

At the same time there is a change of position within the wide midfielders. The invert into the half-space at the moment the double false 9ā€™s go wide. By getting into the half-spaces they are assuming the positions of the strikers and move into the positions to create goalscoring opportunities or to attack any kind of cross/pass into the central zones.

As you can see in the image above, the inverted players move forward as strikers while the false 9ā€™s have occupied the wings and are providing crosses from that particular angle going forward. When in possession this effectively means that the blue teams play 4-2-4 with four attackers and a double pivot behind them to guard any counter-attack. 

In the case of a counter-attack, thereā€™s a high risk, because there is a lot of space for the midfield trio of the opponent to progress as they have an overload of 3v2 in midfield. The trio in attack has relative freedom when they are attacking with pace in the counter.

Final thoughts

This is a rather short case study on the positioning of the double false 9 in a 4-4-2, but I thought it was really interesting to see how the double false 9 not only have to play as deep-striker, but also need to have some winger qualities to function in this system, while the wide-midfielders become inverted.

INSIDE DUTCH ACADEMY SCOUTING

Posted on by admin

Being a scout or scouting in general is not as easy as it looks like. This is not to blow my own horn, but this is the truth. Not everyone is cut out to be a scout. Whether it is something for you to do or not, I canā€™t decide that for you ā€“ but I can tell you what it is to be a scout within an academy with a professional football club in the Netherlands.

On Twitter, I have been posting a lot about data scouting and recruitment with the occasional video analysis, but actual real-life scouting is something different. Especially when looking into kids/youngsters. In this piece, I will illustrate what aspects of scouting I have experience with and what some of the difficulties are.

Whatā€™s important to know that my experience of academy scouting consists of working within an organisation that needs to reduce costs and therefore will look for creativity in the region rather than the volume of scouts in the whole country.

The Role
It sounds kind of fancy: academy scout, and I would love to give a clear definition of what the role entails, but this might be different for every country or every club. The structure is like follows: there are five regions and each region has 3 or 4 scout with a coordinating scout or ā€˜headscoutā€™ of that particular region.

Each region consists of 10 or more grassroots/non-league clubs. Each scout is responsible for 3 or 4 clubs which he or she monitors for the different age brackets. In the club that I scout for, we look at the U8ā€™s until the U12ā€™s. This is because at our club, the teams only start from the U12 and up.

The scout is tasked to look at different clubs and their teams and scout the children that might be good enough for the academy we are scouting for OR are considered good enough to train with a higher resistance.

Academy set up
There is a difference between scouting and recruitment. Obviously you can do a lot of scouting and recommend many players, but in the end a selection has to be made of players that can actually join the academy. This can happen through three possible options:

  1. Training programme. The younger players will train in a training program with the possibility of joining the U12 or U13.
  2. A player is scouted through the resistance programs of the Dutch football association. I will explain that later in this piece.
  3. Player is scouted from the age 14 and up ā€“ exceptionally good and can join instantly
  4. Players that have been let go from bigger academies and are picked up

Sometimes, there have to be more players get into the academy. This has to do with the flow of academy players to the first team. This means that in every team, players will flow to a team from a higher age bracket. From U16 to U18, U18 to U21 etcetera.

The clubs
So as Iā€™ve said there are a number of clubs in involved in the region. These are all amateurclubs, but itā€™s hard to get a player to sign for you as there different professional clubs scouting in the same areas. A mid-table club will definitely have less appeal to a player or their parents than for example a club that regularly played for the title or Europe. That means you have to be creative and quick.

The region consists of 10 clusters of which 5 are based in Germany. Clubs opt a lot for local identity and significance rather than scout all over the country and beyond. Obviously, this has also got to do with the finances of clubs and the idea of identification of fans with the club. Taken this all into consideration, itā€™s both culturally and financially the best decision to scout in the direct region. This also means that the clubā€™s identity and core principles reflect that of the region they live in.

The approach
I will not go into specifics of how to scout an actual player, perhaps in other articles, but I will talk briefly about the approach of scouting over here.

You maintain a relationship with the head of academies or academy directors of the amateur clubs. If you want to visit the club in questions, you will communicate your presence and ask what are interesting teams to look at. Often they have an idea what good players might be for your club, but be weary of their judgement. Sometimes they like to put forward their own son or daughter for scouting.

A full kit is provided, but not every club appreciates the fact that you walk in full kit. It will give some anxiety to the kids OR kids will be playing differently, because they now a certain scout is watching them. thatā€™s why I always check first with the amateur club if they want to see this or not.

When you scouted a player, you canā€™t approach them directly. That seems obvious in these times of COVID-19, but this has also to do with privacy rules. If you want the names of certain players you have to ask their coach and after confirmation/go ahead of the parents, you will receive the names and you can pass them forward to the head of scouting of your club.

Before you will pass them on, you will grade them into three categories:

  • Good enough for the academy
  • Good player, but needs to be assessed under higher resistance
  • Not good enough (yet), take a look at a later moment

Only the players with first grade will go into the academy program.

The Association
When players are good, but you have doubts about their immediate ability to play for a pro club, you have the option to let them go the training programs with the Dutch association. The reason you do this, is to see a certain number of talented players playing with and against each other. Then you can properly assess their abilities and whether they can be scouted for a pro club/academy.

These players are selected and will train with each other, and occasionally play against each other and against pro academies. Scouts are invited to these games and can make up their mind whether a player is fit for their academy or not.

Girls vs Boys
This is a difficult one for me personally. While we scout for a club that only has menā€™s football, the opportunity for girls shouldnā€™t be disgarded. We obvioulsy canā€™t scout them for an organisation like ours or similar, but we can give the scouting reports to the football association. They have more training programs for girls and therefore can organise events where girlā€™s/womenā€™s football scout can come in.

Although I can say that I have the ability to scout, sometimes you have to focus on different things with girls. Girls and boys are not similar in a lot of things, such is womenā€™s football not comparable to menā€™s football. We shouldnā€™t compare them, but it is important to learn about the differences and talk to people in the womenā€™s game to become better scouts. Something to be mindful about.

Racial profiling
You have to train yourself to be or become a scout. You have to be aware that you are prejudiced and therefore some decision need to be evaluated. One thing that I have encountered a lot, is racial profiling. Iā€™m not talking about racism ā€“ although that is present everywhere. Iā€™m talking about the fact that we are led to believe that white players are more technically gifted and black players have more pace and are better physically (this is just one example, there are many more).

Iā€™ve training myself to not be affected by this by asking several opinions on the player and looking to players from other ethnical backgrounds with the same profile.

Responsibilities
You have a few responsibilities. Itā€™s important to remember that you not only are there to scout a player or to chat with fellow-minded people. You are part of a professional club and you are also a representative of the club. Networking is important, but never forget who you are working for and representing.

The parents
Managing parents is difficult at times. In this time of COVID-19 and privacy regulations, it has become slightly easier. You have to be kind and respectful to the parents, but also firm and resolute. You have to make clear that if their son or daughter is good enough, they will find their way ā€“ and there is nothing you can do something about as parent. Supporting their kid, thatā€™s what it is all about ā€“ and sometimes they need to be reminded of that fact.

Expectations
It is evident that there are expectations when you are scouting. You have to deliver the names of players so that the recruitment process can start. But donā€™t put too much pressure on yourself. There are a few players who have been scouted and have gone on to become elite players ā€“ Frenkie de Jong-esque. You might never scout a player that is going to make professional football or more ā€“ and thatā€™s rather okay. The main thing is that you make the academy more complete and better.

Case study men’s football Italy: Defending with a 3-1-4-2 in the Italian Primavera

Posted on by admin

I love to make these analyses of case studies and in this piece I will look at the Italian Primavera or the U19 games of men’s football in Italy. I’ve studied 17 clubs across different levels in the Primavera.

Why Primavera?
Why the Primavera? This has everything to do with academy football. They are the highest youth teams in Italy and they demonstrate a playing philosophy that has been nearly perfected and that should be reflected by the first team. The difference is that a first team MUST get results, while an academy team is a lot about development and growth of a player. That’s the main reason why I wanted to look into the primavera.

So I specifically concentrated on teams playing a 3-1-4-2. This could be read as 3-5-2, but the reason why I made this distinction is because of the role of the single pivot or defensive midfielder.

In possession

With the ball the teams playing a 3-1-4-2 had a very clear structure. They had three central defenders, two wing backs and a very distinct playing defensive midfielder. Two advances midfielders or two number ’10’s – and of course the two strikers. In the image below you can see how they typically were set up

As you can see in the image above, they are lined up against a 4-4-2 (which is not exactly typical in Italian football, but used a lot for training purposes). The back three us playing close to each other and what was important for the teams playing with the back three, was that the left central defender and the right central defender, were confident on the ball and they were tasked with playing passes through the middle to the advanced midfielders.

In possession, the two wing-backs played high up the pitch, in the middle third. They contribute to the attack via receiving passes, making runs down the line and providing crosses into the box from the flank. The strikers would attack these and try to score from these crosses.

The defensive midfielder would play a little bit more conservative. He would distribute passes forward and pick out key passes or through passes, but remained on his position. This was needed as he was tasked with organising rest-defence and being the first player to break the attack. A solid rest-defence of four players was often a required principle of the teams researched.

Out of possession

When the opponents have the ball and advance from the middle third to the defensive third, the 3-1-4-2 has transformed into a 6-2-2 formation, which give a very compact defensive line.

As you can see in the image above, the opponent has advances and change to a 4-2-4 formation, which mean that the team researched needed to create majority in defence to win the direct duels. They have been doing that by dropping deep with their back three, as you can see.

The defensive midfielder drops deep and plays very close to the back three in order to create a 4v2 in the middle. The wing backs also have dropped deep and play on the same line as the defensive midfielder – effectively making it a 6-man defence which gives them a superiority of six against the four attackers of the opponent.

The two advances midfielders also drop and support the defence, but at the same time look at the defensive midfielders of the opponent in case they want to progress on the field. The two strikers become detached from each other with one striker staying high and the other dropping a bit more in his shadow.

Transition from attack to defence

Of course you have a transition phase from attack to defence and defence to attack, but I thought the transition from attack to defence was particularly interesting. The 3-1-4-2 advanced on the pitch with the three central defenders positioned in the middle third.

As soon as they lost the ball you had four players moving a direction to try to regain possession of the ball.

As you can in the image below, a few things have changed from the 3-1-4-2 when the ball is lost in the attacking third. The wing backs have to trail back in order to assist the defence and make sure the four-man attack of the opponent can’t progress too much.

The defensive ‘diamond’ – consisting of the three central defenders and the defensive midfielder – changes into a four-man defence. The central duo is formed by the middle central defender and the defensive midfielder.

The left central defender and right central defender leave their position and go press the wide-midfielders of the opponent in order to regain possession of the ball or draw them into making mistakes. This looks like a 4-4-2 just when they lost the ball, but eventually changes into the 6-2-2 as we have seen above.

Final thoughts

It was great to see that a lot of Primavera teams played with three at the back with a defensive midfielder, but what was surprising to me was the fact that played with six at the back in the defensive phase of play when the opponent attacked with three or more attackers. This might not be exactly the case in the first team, but to me it was a sign that the defensive art of play still is living in Italy.

Case study Northern-Ireland: Roles in the 5-3-2 formation in U18’s

Posted on by admin

A few of you might know this, but I have done a year abroad in Northern-Ireland. Belfast to be more specific. While studying abroad Iā€™ve learnt a lot about the history of the region Iā€™ve been, the religious difficulties and violence, and about the customs of the specific area I was located. While I could talk about these things for ages, I wanted to talk about my experiences with Northern-Irish football. This is a football blog after all.

I’ve previously written about case studies in the Netherlands concentrating on inverted full backs, ball playing central defenders, zonal marking in set pieces, and the 4-3-3 & 4-2-3-1 formation. While I’ve finished the case study in the Netherlands, I wanted to have a look at Northern-Ireland as it has shaped me as a coach. In this analysis I will look at the 5-3-2 that was employed against a 4-4-2/

In this analysis I will focus on what Iā€™ve observed in the games Iā€™ve seen in the U18’s league. This might be different to what senior sides do and the decisions made in attack, defence and transition can therefore be different than what is best, but this analysis looks at what happened.

5-3-2
Formations are not set in stone throughout the match, but often are starting points at the beginning of a half or when a set-piece is taken. Formations are fluid as we can see in maps with average positions. The idea of position versus zones is a debate you can have, but in theory a 5-3-2 can broken down in the following: 5 defenders, 3 midfielders and 2 attackers.

Often a 5-3-2 is a defensive state and it become a 3-5-2, but in the games I’ve observed at the time, this was not the case. This was a 5-3-2, that changed a little bit during the attacking phase of the game, but it was no 3-5-2 with 5-3-2 in the defensive phase in the game and that has all to do with the roles of the lateral defenders.

Full backs or wing backs

In the image above you see a 3-5-2 formation with wing backs. These two players have a very specific role going forward and dropping deep. In defence this 3-5-2 become a 5-3-2 and in attack this become a 3-3-4 in most cases I’ve seen.

In the 5-3-2 I’ve observed there was always a back-five with an individual role of a full back to go high up the pitch into the middle third, but no higher than that. The rule in going foward was: only one of the full backs could higher up the pitch, the other would play deep – which in some case could result to a 4-4-2 in formation or 4-3-3 with a deep-lying #10.

Midfield trio

The midfield consists of three players. In the games I’ve observed there were two different scenarios:

  • Scenario #1: There was a double pivot of two defending midfielders with an attacking midfielder playing more advanced. This attacking midfielder had the role of a #10 and would play closer to the two strikers when the team was in possession and in the attacking third.
  • Scenario #2: There were two midfielder lying deep, but they were not a classic double pivot. The two deep-lying midfielders consist of a defensive midfielder + a central midfielder. That central midfielder moves along with the phases of play. In defence he plays deep and more defensively and in attack he moves to a more advances position, close to the #10.

In defence the double pivot would drop so that there would be a clear number of defensive-minded player. In reality there would be seven players defending with three attacking-minded players.

Strikers

Evidently this system plays with two strikers. In the images I’ve included in this piece, the strikers are not playing close to each other and have space between them. This is done intentionally as they were not classic strikers, but neither were they wingers. These players had the task to win the duels, hold on to the ball and move to a certain flank in order to create space in the middle and on the other flank. The other striker and attacking midfield could then move forward and create danger in front of goal. In this system, the two ‘strikers’ were identical in their role and in their style of play.

Another way of playing was when the two strikers played close to each other, but they had different qualities to bring to the game. There was one striker who was big, strong in the air and very good in holding the ball. The other striker was quicker, more agile and made more runs into specific areas to compliment the qualities of the first striker. This dynamic was supported by the attacking midfielder when he moved more up the pitch.

Allow freedom on the flanks

The main issue with the use of full backs instead of wing backs in the 5-3-2 is the freedom on the flanks. Because of the nature of the lateral defenders, pressing high up the opponent’s half or even in the middle third, is not really feasible. Thus, it is easy for the opponents to advance with wide midfielders and/or wingers. Because of the five-man defence they are dealt with quite easily, but it leaves the opponent too much freedom to dominate the game.

I gained valuable experience researching this system in Northern-Ireland. Like I said, it has shaped me as a coach and made me think of the benefits of a three-man central defence. Obviously there are flaws to this system and perhaps the use of wing backs or employing a 3-5-2 is essential, but it was great to see this being used in the U18’s.

*The tactical images are made with Tactical Pad, which gave me the freedom to alter the pitch just like I wanted to.

Case study: 4-2-3-1 formation analysis

Posted on by admin

My fourth and last case study in Dutch academy football concentrates on formations. More specifically, Iā€™ve looked at two formations used in the U18ā€™s of several clubs. This analysis focuses on the theory of whatā€™s good and whatā€™s not so good about the 4-3-3 formations and the 4-2-3-1 formations. In part II: 4-2-3-1

These two formations have been used the most by the teams in the U18 leagues Iā€™ve observed and in this analysis I will focus on a few things:

  • The defensive role of the midfield: double or single pivot
  • The attacking role of the midfield: the number ā€™10ā€™
  • Pressing from the front

Often formation is used by media and fans as something that is static, as if each players holds a specific position ā€“ but as you may have seen or know, they are rather fluid and change within the game. But the roles asigned to players in a system, thatā€™s whatā€™s important in a game.

In this analysis I will focus on what Iā€™ve observed in the games Iā€™ve seen in the U18 league. This might be different to what senior sides do and the decisions made in attack, defence and transition can therefore be different than what is best, but this analysis looks at what happened.

The 4-2-3-1

A 4-3-3 is the formation of the Dutch footballing DNA. Many academies have been drenched with the idea of a 4-3-3, but the 4-2-3-1 is being played more often nowadays. This has to do with the idea that the playing philosophy of the first team should reflect the academy and vice versa.

There is a back four and a low defensive bloc – which also can be described as the double pivot in midfield. These six player form the defensive side of the starting 11. The attacking midfield consists of three players with #11 and #7 having space in front of them and the #10 staying a bit deeper. In this system there is one striker, as you can see with the #9.

Looking back at the games I’ve seen, the double pivot has not only a role to play in defence, but also in attack. How? The double pivot consisted of two defensive midfielders or a central + defensive midfield combination (the central midfielder would have more defensive qualities than attacking). This double pivot makes it so that there are essentially six defensive players in the team and this enables the four attacking players to think more in attack.

These four players are not only tasked with attacking, but they are encouraged and allowed to express more creative freedom. When they lose the ball, there is a defensive bloc that will try to deal with it in transition, before the back four will be threatened by the opponent’s attack.

There a few things different in the games I’ve observed from the 4-3-3. In the image above you can see how the attacks are constructed in a way. The ball was often played from the central defensive duo to the defensive bloc/double pivot. They would have several options going forward, but they often picked out the wide attacking midfielders. The difference is that they are not real wingers in the sense of the 4-3-3, but are more inverted and this is the key.

The #11 and #7 receive the ball and move inside into the box, where they would try to create a chance for the striker via a through ball or, would shoot with from that position. But that’s not the only attacking role they play. In the case that the defensive bloc picks out a pass to the upcoming full backs – who have a slightly more attacking role in this approach – the full backs move into the wide area. The wide midfielders and the #10 all move closer to the box, resulting in the following situation:

  • #9, #7 and #11 in the box
  • #10 in zone 14

The full backs had two options going forward which would create a lot of threat. Option one was to swing the ball into the box via a cross, with three players trying to attack that cross in the air. Option two was that the full back would go closer to the back line and try to pick out the #10, who was moving forward from zone 14.

The 4-2-3-1 was very effective when the team went into transition from defence to attack and wanted to create a goalscoring opportunity quickly. They could take risks and be more direct, because of their ‘safety-net’ of the double pivot.

Like I said above, hwne the ball was lost – the first line of dence was the double pivot, but that didn’t mean that the midfield was lost. The formation shifted and although the double pivot had to deal with the threat of the opponent, the formation would then change into a 4-5-1 formation in most cases in order to create a numeric advantage in midfield.

You can see this in the image above. When for example #10 lost a all, #6 and #8 were tasked of stopping the opponent. At the same time the attacking midfielders would drop deeper and join the double pivot to create a five-man midfield.

The 4-5-1 doesn’t really differ too much from the 4-2-3-1 as a midfield, but the defensive bloc and the attacking midfielders are playing more compactly, which makes them stronger as a defensive unit. At the same time it’s easier when they are transitioning from defence to attack, to get back in the shape of the 4-2-3-1.

It’s a slightly different approach than with a 4-3-3 with more attacking threat created to central zones of the pitch rather than from the flanks. The involvement of full backs from the flanks creates a different dynamic though, but the idea of having a defensive and attacking bloc, sits very well with some of the teams observed in the Dutch U18’s leagues.

*The tactical images are made with Tactical Pad, which gave me the freedom to alter the pitch just like I wanted to.